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I. INTRODUCTION
Communication over the Internet continues to grow in popularity
among individuals and businesses. As the Internet becomes friendlier to
casual users, computing technology is converging with telecommunica-
tions technology.' Cell phones incorporate email and web browsing
1. The convergence of these industries is well documented in the media. For example,
a joint announcement in 1998 by Hewlett-Packard Co. and Cisco Systems detailed their plans
to manufacture equipment for telephone companies that will integrate voice and data commu-
nications. Eventually, video may also be integrated into the network. Tom Quinlan,
Technology Deals Aim to Bring Together Voice, Data Networks, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Nov. 2, 1998, at IE; see Stephen Lee, Voice Over IP gets Wake-Up Call, INFOWORLD, May 4,
2001, at http://www.infoworld.com/articles/hn/xml/O1/05/07/010507hnvoip.xml (last visited
December 4, 2003).
Moreover, IBM, Intel, Toshiba, Nokia, and Ericsson have established a standard for wire-
less communication known as "Bluetooth," which is a computing and telecommunications
industry description of the manner in which products such as personal computers, cellular
phones, personal digital assistants, and other devices can interconnect using a short range
wireless connection. Approximately 1,900 companies have adopted the Bluetooth standard.
Chris Gaither, Bluetooth Defies Obituaries, N.Y. TIMES, December 20, 2001, at G5; Janet Rae-
Dupree, Bluetooth Lets Gadgets Speak in One Language, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May
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capabilities, while Personal Digital Assistants feature cell phone
functions. Meanwhile, Internet telephony enables users to conduct voice
conversations between computers, between a computer and a telephone,
or between telephones
The Federal Wiretap Act3 generally prohibits the use of technology
to intercept "oral" communication between people taking part in a face-
to-face conversation, "wire" communication between parties to a tele-
phone conversation, or "electronic" communication via computer. The
Stored Communications Act4 protects the privacy of wire and electronic
communications held in electronic storage at an electronic communica-
tion service. The statutes set out the procedures that must be followed by
law enforcement officials in order to obtain judicial authorization for
monitoring these communications.
In drafting these statutes, Congress unduly focused on the different
communications technologies rather than the common privacy interests
that exist across all media of communication. As a result, different stan-
dards govern the issuance of judicial authorization for law enforcement
officers to conduct a telephone wiretap, to intercept email, or to covertly
access email from storage in a person's mailbox at his Internet Service
Provider.
Complicating matters further, most of the statutory framework was in
place before wireless telephone communications became commonplace
and before the Internet became available to the general public. As
telecommunications and computing technologies continue to advance
and to converge with one another, the statutory scheme will become
15, 2000, at 58; Amy Doan, Cutting the Cord, FORBES, August 23, 1999, at 48; Whatis.com,
Bluetooth, at http://whatis.techtarget.com/definitionsSearchResults/1,289878,sid9,00.html?
query=bluetooth (last visited November 9, 2003); but see Carmen Nobel, Still Waiting for
Bluetooth, EWEEK, April 23, 2001, at 1.
Another recent event highlighting this convergence between technologies is the an-
nouncement of a new wireless handheld device based on an Intel chipset running the
Microsoft Smartphone 2002 operating system. It will be able to make voice calls, send email,
play music and video, take pictures, and keep a diary. The device is to be introduced in Europe
by the end of the third quarter of 2003. Wintel Teams Up With Taiwan's MiTAC, Unveils
Smartphone, THE ELECTRONIC TIMES (Korea), August 14, 2003, available at 2003 WL
4177042.
2. See Steve Bass, Net Phones: Dialing Without Dollars, PC WORLD, November 2000,
at http://www.pcworld.com/reviews/article.aspaid=18623 (last visited November 9, 2003). In
Australia, a coalition of universities and research institutions is averaging 5,000 long distance
calls per business day over the Internet at an estimated savings of 70-90 per cent. Geoffrey
Maslen, Australian Universities Use Internet for Long-Distance Calls, THE CHRONICLE OF
HIGHER EDUCATION, April 3, 2001, at http://chronicle.comfree/2001/04/2001040301t.htm
(last visited November 9, 2003); see Florence Olsen, Colleges Experiment with Routing On-
Campus Phone Calls over the Internet, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, October 23,
2001, at http://chronicle.com/free/2001/10/2001102301t.htm (last visited November 9, 2003).
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2000).
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increasingly out of touch with the privacy expectations of the American
public.
I argue that a person's privacy interest in his email is the same as his
privacy interest in a telephone conversation. Moreover, the privacy inter-
est in email remains unchanged regardless of whether it is intercepted in
transmission or covertly accessed from the recipient's mailbox. If one
accepts this assumption, it follows that the level of protection against
surveillance by law enforcement officers should be the same.
However, inconsistencies in the Federal Wiretap Act and the Stored
Communications Act lead to illogical distinctions in the treatment of
wire and electronic communication. For example, fewer federal officials
are empowered to seek authorization for a telephone wiretap than are
empowered to seek authorization for the interception of email. With
proper authorization, a telephone wiretap can be conducted only during
the investigation of specifically enumerated federal crimes. However,
email can be intercepted during the investigation of any federal felony.
In the event of an unlawful telephone wiretap, telephone conversations
are protected by a statutory exclusionary rule. In contrast, unlawfully
intercepted email receives only the lesser protection of the constitutional
exclusionary rule as limited by the "good faith" exception.
Until October 2001, voicemail received greater protection from po-
lice searches than was extended to email stored in the recipient's
mailbox at his Internet Service Provider. Surprisingly, during the course
of its transmission, email is afforded greater statutory protection against
interception by the police than is extended to email stored in the recipi-
ent's mailbox. A federal district court recently held that a message
remaining on the Internet Service Provider's server after it has been read
by the intended recipient is no longer statutorily protected from unau-
thorized access.
Patricia M. Worthy correctly points out that Congress has
consistently employed a technology-driven approach in protecting the
privacy of telephone conversations as conventional wire telephones
evolve into wireless devices. An attempt by Congress to follow a similar
approach with respect to communication via computer may prove to be
unworkable due to the rapid pace of technological innovation. Worthy is
correct in stating that "[t]he pace of technological change necessitates
5. As will be discussed later, the Federal Wiretap Act was amended in 1986 to extend
its protections to cellular telephone conversations, while expressly excluding the radio portion
of cordless telephone conversations from protection. The statute was amended again in 1994
to remove this exclusion. See Patricia M. Worthy, The Impact of New and Emerging Telecom-
munications Technologies: A Call to the Rescue of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 39 How L.J.
437,448-54 (1996).
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adopting legal reforms that are derived from a technology-neutral basis,
and, therefore, are not rooted in current technology.
' 6
As technology continues to blur the distinction between wire and
electronic communication, it becomes apparent that a new methodology
must be developed in order to provide logical and consistent protection
to private communications. The statutes must be revised so as to protect
the privacy of communications while also providing a means by which
law enforcement officers can obtain judicial approval to eavesdrop when
necessary. Otherwise, increasing integration between data and voice
communications will render the current statutory scheme arbitrary and
impractical.
By way of background, this article will discuss the law governing
mail searches as well as the law of covert searches generally. This article
will go on to discuss the regulation of pen registers, and will then trace
the evolution of the relevant federal statutory and constitutional protec-
tions afforded to telephone conversations.
Next, this article will discuss the statutory protections and the
emerging case law addressing the privacy of email and other communi-
cation via computer. Particular emphasis will be placed on several recent
federal court decisions that illustrate the problems arising from the cur-
rent statutory scheme.
Lastly, this article will discuss the controversial implementation of
the FBI's "Carnivore" software for the purpose of surreptitiously inter-
cepting email, and the recent deployment of a keystroke-logging device
as another means of learning the contents of private electronic communi-
cations.
This article asserts that the Fourth Amendment protections applica-
ble to telephone conversations set out by Katz v. United States7 and
Berger v. New York8 (subsequently codified and expanded by the Federal
Wiretap Act) should be implemented more broadly to encompass the
surreptitious surveillance of postal mail, email, and other promising
forms of electronic communication. 9 This article argues in favor of more
uniform regulation of covert surveillance of private communications re-
gardless of the choice of technology employed to convey the message.IO
6. Id. at 471.
7. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
8. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
9. James X. Dempsey questions whether our traditional concepts of the Fourth
Amendment remain valid in this context when "many of our most important records are not
'papers' in our 'houses,' but are 'bytes' stored electronically and accessed remotely at 'virtual'
locations." James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age: Revitalizing the
Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 65, 88-89 (1997).
10. The irrational distinctions in the treatment of various communications technologies
were recognized in a 1994 law review comment by a student author calling for statutory
Fall 20031
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II. MAIL SEARCHES AND OTHER COVERT SEARCHES
A. The Law of Mail Searches
A mail search may be an isolated event limited to a single letter, or it
may continue over an extended period of time so as to permit law en-
forcement officials to surreptitiously read an ongoing exchange of
correspondence. This latter possibility poses a particularly grave threat to
privacy unless closely supervised by the judiciary because the police
carry out the search and seizure operation without giving contemporane-
ous notice to the correspondents. In this respect, the issues raised by mail
searches are similar to those raised by telephone wiretaps. Regardless of
the medium of communication, similar expectations of privacy are called
into question when the police conduct a covert surveillance with judicial
authority to delay notification to the person whose communications have
been searched.
Ex Parte Jackson" is often cited for the proposition that letters
placed in first class mail cannot be opened and read by law enforcement
officers in the absence of a search warrant.' 2 The Court stated that:
[A] distinction is to be made between different kinds of mail
matter, between what is intended to be kept free from inspection,
such as letters, and sealed packages subject to letter postage; and
what is open to inspection, such as newspapers, magazines,
pamphlets, and other printed matter, purposely left in a condition
to be examined. Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the
mail are as fully guarded from examination and inspection, ex-
cept as to their outward form and weight, as if they were
retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.
The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be se-
cure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures
extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever
they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and
examined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affir-
mation, particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is
required when papers are subjected to search in one's own
household. No law of Congress can place in the hands of offi-
cials connected with the postal service any authority to invade
the secrecy of letters and such sealed packages in the mail; and
amendments. Thomas R. Greenberg, Comment, E-Mail and Voice Mail: Employee Privacy
and the Federal Wiretap Statute, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 219, 251-52 (1994).
11. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
12. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.3(b), at 467-68 (3d ed.
1996).
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all regulations adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in
subordination to the great principle embodied in the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution. 3
Although the Court clearly stated that the protections of the Fourth
Amendment are applicable to letters placed in the mail, this language
was merely dicta. The Court went on to state that the only issue to actu-
ally be decided was the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the
mailing of certain letters intended to deceive the public and obtain
money under false pretenses.' 4 That statute was upheld and the underly-
ing criminal conviction was allowed to stand.' 5
In deference to the strong policies favoring the privacy of first class
mail, statutory and regulatory protections have been enacted. 39 U.S.C.
§ 3623(d) states:
The Postal Service shall maintain one or more classes of mail
for the transmission of letters sealed against inspection. The rate
for each such class shall be uniform throughout the United
States, its territories, and possessions. One such class shall pro-
vide for the most expeditious handling and transportation
afforded mail matter by the Post Office. No letter of such a class
of domestic origin shall be opened except under authority of a
search warrant authorized by law, or by an officer or employee
of the Postal Service for the sole purpose of determining an ad-
dress at which the letter can be delivered, or pursuant to the
authorization of the addressee.
6
This language is echoed in 39 C.F.R. § 233.3(g)(1), which states:
No person in the Postal Service except those employed for that
purpose in dead-mail offices, may open, or inspect the contents
of, or permit the opening or inspection of sealed mail without a
federal search warrant, even though it may contain criminal or
otherwise nonmailable matter, or furnish evidence of the com-
mission of a crime, or the violation of a postal statute.1
7
In 1970, the Supreme Court considered the extent to which a pack-
age placed in the mail was protected from interception by the police in
13. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733.
14. Id. at 736-37.
15. Id.
16. Similar language had previously appeared at 39 U.S.C. § 4057 (Supp. II 1959-
1960). But mail originating outside of the United States may generally be searched pursuant to
the more relaxed rules governing border searches. See 19 C.F.R. § 145.2; see also 4 LAFAVE,
supra note 12, § 10.50), at 597-603.
17. 39 C.F.R. § 233.3(g)(1) (2003).
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the absence of a search warrant. In United States. v. Van Leeuwen," the
Post Office delayed delivery of two suspicious packages for about a day
while the police conducted an investigation and obtained a search war-
rant. The police then opened the packages, which contained gold coins
that were imported in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 545.
The defendant's conviction in District Court was reversed by the
Ninth Circuit.' 9 On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that a delay of
about 29 hours from the time the defendant mailed the packages until the
search warrant was served did not violate the Fourth Amendment prohi-
bition against unreasonable search and seizure.' °
The Court reasoned that first class mail, such as letters and sealed
packages subject to letter postage, is free from postal inspection except
in accordance with the Fourth Amendment and that the detention of the
package until a search warrant was obtained did not amount to an unrea-
sonable seizure under the circumstances.2'
It is significant to note that the defendant in Ex Parte Jackson was
convicted of an offense based on the content of a letter. In contrast, the
Van Leeuwen conviction was founded on the presence of a physical ob-
ject. Yet Justice Douglas's opinion in Van Leeuwen acknowledged the
possibility that mail searches can implicate First Amendment issues as
well as Fourth Amendment issues,22 thereby providing further reason to
strictly safeguard the privacy of the mail.
An interesting discussion of mail searches can be found in United
States v. Rollack .2' There, the defendant was imprisoned for federal
narcotics conspiracy charges prior to and during his trial. While he was
in jail, federal agents seeking evidence of further crimes intercepted his
incoming and outgoing mail over a period of nine days pursuant to a
search warrant. The warrant waived the normal statutory requirement of
contemporaneous notice of the search. Instead, delayed notice was
authorized in order to avoid compromising the investigation.
Continuation of the surreptitious mail search was authorized by
18. 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
19. Id. at 250.
20. Id. at 253.
21. Id.
22. In an apparent reference to Ex Parte Jackson, Justice Douglas explained:
The course of events since 1878 has underlined the relevance and importance of the
Post Office to our constitutional rights. Mr. Justice Holmes in United States ex rel.
Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437, 41 S.Ct.
352, 363, 65 L.Ed. 704 (dissenting opinion), said that 'the use of the mails is almost
as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues.'
Id. at 251.
23. 90 F. Supp. 2d 263 (S.D.N.Y 1999).
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subsequent warrants. At trial, the defendant moved to suppress evidence
obtained through the mail search.24
The court held that prisoners do not have an expectation of privacy
with respect to searches performed by prison officials in order to main-
tain institutional security.2 But even prisoners have a reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding searches unrelated to institutional secu-
rity that are conducted by law enforcement officers other than those in
charge of the prison.26
Next, the court addressed the question of whether the mail search
complied with the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
41 (d), which generally mandates that officers executing a search warrant
must provide contemporaneous notice to the person whose property was
searched. The court concluded that the judge issuing a warrant can au-
thorize a delay of seven days for giving notice. 2' Longer delays are
permissible upon a strong showing of necessity. And additional delays
can be granted upon subsequent application. 2' This aspect of the Rule
gives law enforcement officers the latitude to conduct "sneak and peak"
searches where contemporaneous notice would compromise the investi-
gation.29
The court held that even though the nine-day period of time author-
ized by the initial warrant was two days too long, suppression of the
evidence is not necessary unless "(1) there was 'prejudice' in the sense
that the search might not have occurred or would not have been so abra-
sive if the Rule had been followed, or (2) there is evidence of intentional
and deliberate disregard of a provision in the Rule., 30 Neither of these
circumstances was found to exist and so the motion to suppress was de-
nied.3'
Actually, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 made no mention
of delayed notice at the time Rollack was decided.32 Nevertheless,
Rollack is consistent with several other federal decisions that create an
exception to the statutory requirement of contemporaneous notice. These
decisions provide an interesting foundation for the law of covert searches
in general, though highly specialized rules govern the monitoring of
telephone conversations and email messages.
24. Id. at 266-68.
25. Id. at 270.
26. Id. at 269-70. But see Willis v. Artuz, 301 E3d 65 (2d Cir. 2002).
27. Rollack, 90 E Supp. 2d at 271.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 386-87 (2d Cir. 1975)).
31. Id. at 271-72.
32. FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 41 (1999).
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B. Other Covert Searches
In Dalia v. United States,33 the FBI installed an electronic bugging
device in an office pursuant to judicial authorization issued according to
the then-existing provisions of Title 18, Chapter 1 19. The warrant did
not expressly authorize the covert entry necessary to install the bug. The
District Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence of his
monitored conversations, 35 and his conviction for receiving stolen goods
was affirmed by the Third Circuit.
6
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment
does not absolutely prohibit law enforcement officers from making sur-
reptitious entries associated with a judicially authorized search.37 When
covert activity is necessary, Fourth Amendment considerations are satis-
fied if the person who was subjected to surveillance is notified upon the
38
conclusion of the operation.
Nor does Fourth Amendment jurisprudence require prior, express
judicial approval for a covert entry. The manner in which a search is
executed is generally left to the discretion of law enforcement officers,
subject only to the prohibition against "unreasonable searches and
seizures."'39 Therefore, neither the covert entry nor the use of the
eavesdropping device ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment. And the
legislative history of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 reveals that Congress
intended to permit covert entry when necessary to install the equipment
needed for electronic surveillance. n
Dalia recognized the nexus between the privacy interests that are
compromised by the "bugging" of private conversations in an office and
33. 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
35. United States v. Dalia, 426 F Supp. 862 (D.N.J. 1977).
36. United States v. Dalia, 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1978).
37. 441 U.S. 238, 247-48 (1979).
38. The Court wrote:
It is well established that law officers constitutionally may break and enter to exe-
cute a search warrant where such entry is the only means by which the warrant
effectively may be executed.... In United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 429 n.
19 (1977), we held that Title Ill provided a constitutionally adequate substitute for
advance notice by requiring that once the surveillance operation is completed the
authorizing judge must cause notice to be served on those subjected to surveillance.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d). There is no reason why the same notice is not equally
sufficient with respect to electronic surveillances requiring covert entry. We make
explicit, therefore, what has long been implicit in our decisions dealing with this
subject: the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit per se a covert entry performed
for the purpose of installing otherwise legal electronic bugging equipment.
Dalia, 441 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in original).
39. Id. at 254-59.
40. Id. at 249-54.
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the covert entry necessary to install the bugging equipment. Accordingly,
the Court held that when Congress expressly authorized electronic sur-
veillance with judicial approval, Congress implicitly authorized covert
entry as may be necessary to install the electronic bug.'
While Dalia focused on narrow issues concerning electronic surveil-
lance, United States v. Freitas42 addressed the safeguards of Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 41 governing execution of searches in general.
Freitas I arose from an investigation of the manufacture of metham-
phetamine. At trial, the defendant moved to suppress evidence derived
from a search of his home by DEA agents. The search was conducted
pursuant to a warrant authorizing covert entry into a residence that was
suspected of being used as a methamphetamine laboratory. The warrant
permitted the DEA agents to enter the home without notice in order to
look around while the residents were not present. 3
The magistrate issued the warrant using a conventional form that
was designed to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41."
However, he crossed off the item calling for a description of the property
to be seized.4' He also crossed off the boilerplate directing the FBI to
leave a copy of the warrant at the residence along with an inventory of
any property seized, so that the warrant did not contain any provision for
notice to the residents. '
The District Court suppressed certain evidence, holding that surrep-
titious entry warrants are impermissible under the Constitution and also
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. Moreover, the "good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule did not make the evidence ad-
missible. The Government appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
There, the court held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment,
but remanded the case to the district court for further findings of fact in
order to determine whether the good faith exception took the evidence
outside of the exclusionary rule.48 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all covert entries.49 However, the
lack of an express provision in the warrant regarding service of notice
rendered it constitutionally defective. The warrant could have survived a
constitutional challenge by providing for notice within a reasonable time
41. Id. at 252.
42. 800 E2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Freitas 1].




47. Id. at 1453-54.
48. Id. at 1456-57.
49. Id. at 1456.
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after the covert entry.5° "Reasonable" was defined as not more than seven
days except upon a strong showing of necessity.5'
The Ninth Circuit also held that the surreptitious search did not
comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, which provides
inadequate guidance for judicial authorization of covert entries. 2 The
court stated that the desirable amendments to the Rule should originate
through legislative action rather than by way of judicial interpretation.
The court resolved its uncertainty by concluding that the covert entry did
not comply with the Rule. But such a lack of compliance does not re-
quire suppression of evidence unless law enforcement officers
deliberately disregarded the Rule and would not have carried out the
search if they had been forced to obey its terms. The district court was
also instructed to make further findings of fact regarding this point.53
On remand, the district court again suppressed the evidence and the
government again appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Circuit Court held
that the law enforcement officers acted in good faith and so the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule need not be applied 4 Nor did the statu-
tory violation by law enforcement officers necessitate exclusion of the
evidence in the absence of a clear constitutional violation or deliberate
disregard of Rule 41.5'
Freitas I contains an interesting comparison of the privacy interests
that are compromised by surreptitious wiretapping and by covert entry
into a person's residence. The court stated:
The surreptitious character of the search and seizure in this case
calls to mind wiretapping, which is now governed by Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982) [also known as the Federal Wiretap
Act]. The district court held that noncompliance both with Title
III's notice provisions and with the "necessity for electronic sur-
veillance requirement" existed in this case. Reasoning by
analogy, the district court held the search and seizure violated
the Fourth Amendment.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1456-58.
52. Id. at 1456.
53. Id. at 1455-58.
54. United States v. Freitas, 856 F.2d 1425, 1428-32 (9th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Freitas
III.
55. Id. at 1432-33. Freitas H permitted the use of evidence held to have been obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Rule 41 because the police acted in good faith.
Later cases state that a search warrant requiring notice within a reasonable time after comple-
tion of a covert search complies with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment as well as
Rule 41. See United States v. Johns, 948 F.2d 599, 603-06 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1336-38 (2d Cir. 1990).
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Despite the similarity of the problems presented by this case and
wiretapping, Title III has been held to apply only to aural inter-
ception of communication, see New York Telephone Co., 434
U.S. at 166-67, 98 S. Ct. at 369-70, and not to visual observa-
tions. Title III, however, does serve to make clear the probable
constitutional importance of both the necessity for the surrepti-
tious seizure and the subsequent notice.
With respect to a necessity requirement, the record before us
fails to show that it was met. Perhaps it could have been, but,
viewing the record as a whole, we conclude that it merely dem-
onstrates that the search and seizure would facilitate the
investigation of Freitas, not that it was necessary. We hasten to
add, however, that we do not hold that a showing of necessity is
constitutionally required in a case such as is before us. We
merely wish to point out that any such showing is lacking here
and that, had such a showing been made, it could have strength-
ened the claim that the search and seizure in this case met the
commands of the Fourth Amendment.56
The reference to the requirement of "necessity" originates in Berger
v. New York,57 which will be discussed in detail at Section V.A., infra.
Berger held in part that the Fourth Amendment requires police officers
seeking authorization for a wiretap to demonstrate that the wiretap is
necessary because alternatives are either impractical or dangerous. After
Berger, the showing of necessity goes beyond the normal criteria for ob-
taining a standard search warrant, 58 because unlike a routine search, a
wiretap can only be conducted surreptitiously without contemporaneous
notice. Shortly after Berger, Congress codified this and other require-
ments in the Federal Wiretap Act.5 9
Freitas I made clear that it was not extending the "necessity" re-
quirement of Berger to covert searches in general. 60 Yet the discussion
56. Freitas 1, 800 F.2d at 1456. The Second Circuit has gone so far as to hold that law
enforcement officers must make a showing of "reasonable necessity" to justify delay in pro-
viding contemporaneous notice when they wish to conduct a covert-entry search. However,
the officers do not have to meet the same rigorous standards as set out in the Federal Wiretap
Act. Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337-38.
57. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
58. Id. at 59-60.
59. See infra Part V.A.-B.
60. After the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,
Congress enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). Section 213 amended 18 U.S.C.A. § 3103a to authorize delayed
notice of the execution of a search warrant if the court believes that contemporaneous notice
would lead to an "adverse result," the warrant prohibits an actual seizure unless the court
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reveals that the court saw a similarity between the privacy interests that
are compromised by a covert wiretap and by a covert home search.
Likewise, this similarity could be readily found with respect to a covert
mail search or (as will be seen) the surreptitious monitoring of email.
Of course, it is impossible to quantify the extent to which various
types of covert searches invade the privacy of the person under investiga-
tion.6' But this article asserts that the same privacy interest is
compromised by covert searches of letters in the mail, telephone wire-
taps, and surreptitious monitoring of email. Moreover, the same privacy
interest is compromised where law enforcement officers surreptitiously
search a home or office to read letters, other paper documents, or even
computer files stored there.
Regardless of the medium of communication and the manner in
which the covert search is executed, the privacy protections should be
the same when law enforcement officials covertly examine the expres-
sion of a person's private thoughts and ideas. Therefore, it would not be
illogical to extend the procedural safeguards governing wiretapping to
the covert search and seizure of "snail mail," email, and any documents
that are stored in a person's home or office.62
believes that the seizure is justified by reasonable necessity, and the warrant requires that
notice be given within a reasonable time. But the "adverse result" standard shifts the focus
from the "necessity" standard that was discussed in Freitas 1. The "necessity" standard
addresses the extent to which alternatives other than the execution of a surreptitious search
exist. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(3) (Supp. 2003). The "adverse result" standard does not require
consideration of less intrusive alternatives that might yield a similar result. Instead, it assumes
that the search will be conducted, but merely requires consideration of the possibility that
contemporaneous notice may lead to certain undesirable results that could be avoided if notice
is delayed. Where 18 U.S.C.A. § 3103a (Supp. 2003) uses the phrase "reasonable necessity," it
is only with regard to justification for a seizure during the execution of the search, but not a
prerequisite that must be established in order to obtain authorization to conduct the covert
search.
61. The Ninth Circuit theorized that:
[Slurreptitious searches and seizures of intangibles strike at the very heart of the in-
terests protected by the Fourth Amendment. The mere thought of strangers walking
through and visually examining the center of our privacy interest, our home,
arouses our passion for freedom as does nothing else. That passion, the true source
of the Fourth Amendment, demands that surreptitious entries be closely circum-
scribed.
Freitas 1, 800 F2d at 1456. But see United States v. Pangbum, 983 F.2d 449, 454-55 (2d Cir.
1993) ("Indeed, it was our perception that a covert entry search for intangibles is less intrusive
than a conventional search with physical seizure because the latter deprives the owner not only
of privacy but also of the use of his property. It is less intrusive than a wiretap or video camera
surveillance because the physical search is of a relatively short duration, focuses the search
specifically on the items listed in the warrant, and produces information as of a given mo-
ment... ") (citing United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1337 (1990)).
62. See Paul V. Konovalov, Note, On a Quest for Reason: A New Look at Surreptitious
Search Warrants, 48 HASTINGs L.J. 435, 472-73 (1997) (asserting that the federal statutory
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Realistically, there is little chance that the entirety of wiretapping
safeguards will be extended anytime soon. But this article will go on to
argue for more uniform protections governing the surreptitious search
and seizure of any media of communication deemed worthy of protec-
tion.
III. LIMITATIONS ON MAIL COVERS AND PEN
REGISTERS IN THE ABSENCE OF FEDERAL
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
A. The Law of Mail Covers
It is clear that an ongoing police effort to covertly monitor the con-
tent of a person's mail or telephone conversations constitutes a serious
invasion of privacy that is limited by the Fourth Amendment's prohibi-
tion of "unreasonable search and seizure." The same should be true of
police efforts to monitor the content of email communications, though
little case law exists in this area.63
Other surreptitious investigative techniques do not reveal the con-
tents of communications, but arguably are so intrusive as to constitute a
search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. For example, postal em-
ployees conducting a "mail cover" will record information appearing on
the outside of envelopes before making delivery to the addressee. 64 This
information, which may include a return address or a postmark, could
• 61
help the police to identify conspirators or to locate a fugitive.
regulation of wiretapping could serve as a guide for issuance and execution of surreptitious
search warrants in general).
63. See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996); see, e.g., infra Part
V.C.1.
64. Mail covers are extensively performed for law enforcement purposes, though they
receive little attention. Elizabeth Amon & Michael Ravnitzky, Mail-Watching Gains in Use:
It's a Low-Tech Tool of Law Enforcement, NAT'L L.J., April 1, 2000, at Al.
65. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 2.7(a), at 618. The current procedure authorizing a mail
cover is set out at 39 C.FR. § 233.3 (2003), which states in relevant part:
(e) The Chief Postal Inspector, or his designee, may order mail covers under the
following circumstances:...
(2) When a written request is received from any law enforcement agency in which
the requesting authority specifies the reasonable grounds to demonstrate the
mail cover is necessary to:
(i) Protect the national security,
(ii) Locate a fugitive,
(iii) Obtain information regarding the commission or attempted commission of a
crime, or
(iv) Assist in the identification of property, proceeds or assets forfeitable because
of a violation of criminal law.
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LaFave argues that mail covers are objectionable because they reveal
a person's continuing associations over time despite the fact that the con-
tents of the letters are not read by law enforcement officials. According
to LaFave, "it is the breadth of the intrusion rather than its depth at any
particular instant in time which is most threatening to privacy."
66
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with LaFave's analysis. In United States
67
v. Choate, the Postal Inspector in Charge, Los Angeles, authorized a
thirty-day mail cover pursuant to the written request of a U.S. Bureau of
Customs agent. Through the mail cover, federal agents learned of a bank
where Choate maintained an account.68 This information was necessary
69to support a charge of attempted tax evasion.
The district court held that the mail cover was instituted in violation
of postal regulations because the mail cover request merely stated in
conclusory language that the defendant was suspected of smuggling
large amounts of narcotics into the United States . In contrast, 39 C.FR.
§ 233.2(e)(1)(ii) required that the mail cover request set out reasonable
grounds demonstrating that the mail cover would aid in locating a fugi-
tive, or that it would assist in obtaining information about a crime or
attempted crime'
Moreover, the court held that the mail cover constituted a war-
rantless search. 72 The court explained that a reasonable person realizes
that the return address on a letter is necessary to route it back to the
sender in the event of a problem with the name or address of the in-
tended recipient. But a reasonable person would expect the return
address to be used only for postal purposes and that no records would be
maintained. Because the mail cover violated a reasonable expectation of
privacy without judicial authorization, evidence derived from it was sup-
pressed.
7 3
On appeal of the suppression order, the Ninth Circuit held that the
mail cover complied with the applicable postal regulations. The court
explained that the conclusions expressed in the mail cover request were
sufficient to satisfy the regulations without spelling out the underlying
facts in support of those conclusions.75
66. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 2.7, at 618.
67. 422 F. Supp. 261 (C.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd 576 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1978).
68. Choate, 422 F. Supp. at 268 n. 12.
69. Id. at 263.
70. Id. at 264-67.
71. Id. at 263-67 (applying 38 C.FR. § 233.2(e)(1)(ii) (1975)).
72. Id. at 271.
73. Id. at 267-71.
74. Choate, 576 F.2d at 171-73.
75. Id.
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The mail cover did not amount to a search because information ap-
pearing on the outside of an envelope is readily available to be seen by
postal employees. And since it is the sender who exposed the informa-
tion to view, the recipient can have no privacy interest where he does not
have the ability to prevent the information from being seen.76 Therefore,
the order granting the motion to suppress evidence was reversed.
77
B. The Law of Pen Registers
A pen register is a device that can be attached to a telephone line,
usually at a central telephone company office, for the purpose of covertly
recording outgoing telephone numbers dialed. The pen register does not
indicate whether anyone answers the outgoing call. The pen register will
also detect and record the number of times a telephone rings when in-
coming calls are received, but does not identify the phone number where
the call originated. Nor does it reveal whether the incoming call is an-
swered. Pen registers neither monitor nor record the content of telephone
conversations."s As distinguished from a pen register, a trap and trace
device performs a function akin to caller ID by recording the telephone
number of incoming calls.7 9
In United States v. New York Telephone Co., 80 the Supreme Court
held that the use of pen registers was not governed by the Federal Wire-
tap Act, which at that time prohibited the interception of oral or wire
communication except in accordance with its provisions.8 ' Because pen
registers do not acquire the contents of telephone conversations, they do
not "intercept" a communication as defined by the statute. Moreover, the
legislative history of the Federal Wiretap Act shows that there was no
82intent to regulate the use of pen registers.
The Supreme Court went on to affirm the power of the federal Dis-
trict Court to authorize installation of a pen register based upon a
showing of probable cause. But the Supreme Court pointed out that all
parties agreed that probable cause existed, and so it was unnecessary to
76. Id. at 174-78.
77. Id. at 183.
78. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 2.7(b), at 622 (citing United States v. Caplan, 255 F
Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1966)).
79. David L. Sobel, Privacy and Law Enforcement in the Digital Age, 18 CoMM. LAW.
3, 4 n.9 (Winter 2000).
80. 434 U.S. 159, 165-68 (1977).
81. The Federal Wiretap Act was subsequently amended by the Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act to also govern the interception of electronic communications. See infra Part
V.B.3.
82. 434 U.S. at 165-68.
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consider whether pen register installation was subject to the require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment. 3
In Smith v. Maryland,84 the Supreme Court held that use of a pen reg-
ister does not amount to a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment
because a person cannot claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in
information that he has turned over to a third party. More specifically, a
caller has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the number he dials
because that number must be conveyed to the telephone company in or-
der to complete the call. Moreover, it is common knowledge that the
telephone company has the ability to make permanent records of each
call because toll calls are itemized on monthly billing statements. By
making a telephone call, the caller runs the risk that the telephone com-
pany will reveal the phone number to the police. 85
And even though the phone company typically does not itemize lo-
cal calls on a monthly billing statement, no reasonable expectation of
privacy exists for local phone numbers dialed because the phone com-
pany could elect to itemize those numbers as well. The fact that the
phone company may choose not to itemize local calls in its monthly
statements to subscribers does not create a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in those numbers. Once a phone number is voluntarily conveyed to
the phone company, that number can be divulged to law enforcement
officers regardless of whether current billing policy actually provides for
itemization in a printed billing statement.
86
The outcome of these two decisions left the installation of pen regis-
ters unrestricted by federal statute or the Fourth Amendment until the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)87 was enacted in 1986.88
The ECPA expressly regulated the use of pen registers and also updated
the Federal Wiretap Act. As codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3121 and amended,
the statute states that: "(a) In general. Except as provided in this section,
no person may install or use a pen register or a trap and trace device
without first obtaining a court order under section 3123 of this title or
83. Id. at 168-69.
84. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
85. Id. at 742-46.
86. Id.
87. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
88. LaFave asserts that "under Smith, the police may without any cause whatsoever and
for whatever purpose they choose uncover private relationships with impunity." 1 LAFAvE,
supra note 12, § 2.7(b), at 626. Despite the absence of federal judicial oversight, it had been
held that pursuant to the Colorado Constitution, use of a pen register constitutes a search and
seizure requiring a warrant based on probable cause in the absence of exigent circumstances
or consent. People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 144 (Colo. 1983).
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under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-63).89
18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1)-(2) authorizes a court to approve the instal-
lation of a pen register or a trap and trace device based on a request by
the appropriate federal or state officials certifying only "that the informa-
tion likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an
ongoing criminal investigation."9 ° The order approving the installation
must include, inter alia, the identity, if known, of the person under inves-
tigation, and a statement of the offense under investigation.9
The operation of the pen register or trap and trace device shall not
exceed 60 days,92 but the court can grant an extension for an additional
60 days upon another showing that information likely to be obtained will
continue to be relevant to the investigation.93 The court can order the
provider of wire or electronic communication service to lend technical
support to law enforcement officers as necessary to set up the pen regis-
ter or trap and trace device.94 Further, the court can prohibit them from
revealing the existence of the investigation. 95
In limited emergency situations, certain designated officials can or-
der the installation of a pen register or trap and trace device before
judicial authorization is obtained.96 But such use must terminate within
48 hours unless judicial approval is obtained. 97
18 U.S.C. § 3121(d) states that a knowing violation of the general
prohibition against use of pen registers or trap and trace devices is
punishable by fines and imprisonment for up to one year.9 Significantly,
the statute does not mandate the exclusion of evidence obtained in
violation of its prohibitions. The lack of an exclusionary rule is not
surprising since the use of a pen register does not constitute a search for
89. The USA PATRIOT Act, section 216, amended 18 U.S.C. § 3127 to expand the
definition of pen register to include software as well as a mechanical device that records out-
going telephone numbers. Moreover, the definition was broadened to make clear that the
statute governs efforts to obtain equivalent information such as the destination address for
email and other types of electronic communication.
Likewise, the definition of trap and trace device was expanded to include software that
records the telephone number from which an incoming call originated. And the definition was
broadened to make clear that the statute also governs efforts to obtain equivalent information
such as the originating address for email and other types of electronic communication.
90. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3123(a)(l)-(2) (Supp. 2003). This certification is far less than the
showing of probable cause necessary to support an application for a standard search warrant.
91. Id. § 3123(b)(1).
92. Id. § 3123(c)(1).
93. Id. § 3123(c)(2).
94. Id. § 3123(b)(2).
95. Id. § 3123(d).
96. Id. § 3125(a).
97. Id. § 3125(b).
98. Id. § 3121(d).
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purposes of the Fourth Amendment. And the courts have been unwilling
to create an exclusionary remedy that is not expressly called for by the
language of the statute.99
It is possible that the functionality of the traditional pen register will
expand in the foreseeable future, requiring further judicial oversight as
the technology becomes more intrusive. Such increased capabilities have
already been mandated by Federal Communications Commission regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA).' °° However, the relevant part of
those regulations has been vacated by the D.C. Circuit.''
CALEA was enacted due to concern that advances in telecommuni-
cations technology are making it increasingly difficult for law
enforcement agencies to conduct wiretaps and similar activities. For ex-
ample, copper cables and traditional switches are being replaced with
fiber optic lines and computers. Cellular phones that are not tied to a
fixed location have become commonplace. In response to these techno-
logical innovations, CALEA was intended to clarify the duty of the
telecommunications industry to cooperate with law enforcement agen-
cies. 1
2
The four general requirements imposed by 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) upon
the telecommunications industry can be summarized as follows:
Telecommunications carriers are to be capable of: (1) quickly
obtaining, for government use, specific communications pursu-
ant to a court order; (2) quickly allowing the government access
to "call-identifying information that is reasonably available;"
(3) delivering the intercepted communications and call-
identifying information to the government over equipment pro-
vided by the carrier for the government; and (4) providing the
previous functions without interference to telecommunication
services and preventing unauthorized interceptions. 
03
For purposes of the current discussion, it is the ability to access call-
identifying information that is relevant to the use of pen registers. Call-
identifying information is defined as "dialing or signaling information
that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of each
99. See United States v. Thompson, 936 F2d 1249, 1251-52 (1 th Cir. 1991).
100. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994).
101. See U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FC.C., 227 F.3d 450, 460-63 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
102. Michael A. Rosow, Note, Is "Big Brother" Listening? A Critical Analysis of New
Rules Permitting Law Enforcement Agencies to Use Dialed Digital Extraction, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 1051, 1058-60 (2000).
103. Id. at 1061 (summarizing 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (1994).
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communication generated or received by a subscriber by means of any
equipment, facility, or service of a telecommunications carrier. ' 0
47 U.S.C. § 1006 goes on to encourage the telecommunications in-
dustry to establish standards for compliance with the requirements of
CALEA. Carriers who abide by these standards qualify for a "safe har-
bor" to avoid fines for failure to meet the statutory requirements."" If the
industry fails to adopt a set of standards, or if a Government agency or
other interested person believes those standards are deficient, the agency
or person can petition the Federal Communications Commission to es-
tablish its own regulations.
After two years of proceedings and negotiations between the Tele-
communications Industry Association (TIA) and the FBI, the TIA
published its technical standards in accordance with the safe harbor pro-
visions of CALEA. These standards were challenged as deficient by the
Center for Democracy and Technology, the Justice Department, and the
FBI. In response to this challenge, the FCC ultimately promulgated regu-
lations.07
The regulations, in relevant part, require telecommunications carriers
to provide "post-cut-through dialed digit extraction" to law enforcement
officials pursuant to a pen register warrant.' 8 Post-cut-through dialed
digit extraction may be explained as follows:
This ... capability requires carriers to monitor electronically the
communications channel that carries audible call content in or-
der to decode all digits dialed after calls are connected or "cut
through." Some post-cut-through dialed digits are telephone
numbers, such as when a subject places a calling card, credit
card, or collect call by first dialing a long-distance carrier access
number and then, after the initial call is "cut through," dialing
the telephone number of the destination party. Post-cut-through
dialed digits can also represent call content. For example, sub-
jects calling automated banking services enter account numbers.
When calling voicemail systems, they enter passwords. When
calling pagers, they dial digits that convey actual messages. And
104. 47 U.S.C. § 1001(2) (1994).
105. Id. § 1006(a)(2).
106. Id. § 1006(b).
107. 14 F.C.C.R. 16794 (1999), 47 C.F.R. §§ 22.1103, 24.903, 64.2203 (1999). See
Rosow, supra note 102, at 1063-65, and U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 454-57
(2000), for a summary of the process leading up to the drafting of these regulations.
108. In the Matter of Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 14 F.C.C.R.
16794, 16846 123 (1999).
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when calling pharmacies to renew prescriptions, they enter pre-
scription numbers.'09
The FCC regulations requiring post-cut-though dialed digit extrac-
tion were challenged in federal court and vacated by United States
Telecom Ass'n v. Federal Communications Commission.1 0 The D.C.
Circuit correctly recognized that some digits dialed after the call has
been completed may constitute content rather than mere call-identifying
information."'
The court hypothesized that a full-blown wiretap warrant might be
required in order to authorize law enforcement officials to obtain any
digits dialed after the call is completed.' 2 Yet the FCC regulations re-
quire the telecommunications carrier to turn over all dialed digits based
on a pen register warrant even though current technology is unable to
distinguish between "digits dialed to route calls and those dialed to
communicate information."" 3 Therefore, this aspect of the agency's order
was vacated for failure to "protect the privacy and security of communi-




The FCC regulations constitute a clear example of a technology-
driven approach to electronic eavesdropping. In drafting its regulations,
the FCC wrongly focused on the technology rather than on the nature of
the privacy interests at risk. The agency regulations seemed to assume
that technology designed to record digits is simply a pen register even if
those digits constitute call content rather than "call-identifying informa-
tion." Fortunately, the D.C. Circuit looked beyond the technology and
recognized the extent of the intrusion upon privacy interests. When the
intrusion amounts to a wiretap, nothing short of a wiretap warrant can
authorize such activity."5
109. U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 462.
110. Id. at 463. The United States Telecom Association and the Cellular Telecommunica-
tions Industry Association, joined by the Center for Democracy and Technology, filed a
petition for review of the FCC regulations. Petitions were also filed by the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the American Civil Liberties Un-
ion. Id. at 456-57.
111. Id. at 462.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 462-63.
115. In response to the decision of the D.C. Circuit, the FCC issued new regulations that
again require telephone companies to have the capability to provide post-cut-through dialed
digit extraction. But the new regulations make clear that post-cut-through digits are to be pro-
vided to a law enforcement agency only pursuant to the appropriate judicial authorization.
Thus, the new regulations carefully avoid any attempt to determine the legal standard under
which the information must be made available to a law enforcement agency. This issue is
correctly left entirely to the courts. In the Matter of Communications Assistance for Law En-
forcement Act, 17 F.C.C.R. 6896 66-93 (2002).
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IV. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE EARLY
LAW GOVERNING WIRETAPS
A. The Supreme Court Initially Provides Little Protection
Against Wiretapping in the Absence of Federal Statute
Any history of the law governing wiretaps should include a discus-
sion of United States v. Olmstead,"6 which is significant for its narrow
view of a person's constitutionally protected privacy interests. It seems
that prohibition agents suspected Olmstead and his attorney, Finch, of
conspiring to violate the National Prohibition Act. Without obtaining a
search warrant, the prohibition agents wiretapped the telephones of
Olmstead and Finch and overheard incriminating discussions.
At trial, the District Court permitted the prosecution to introduce
evidence of the telephone conversations. In reaching this conclusion, the
court discussed the issue of attorney-client privilege, but did not address
the issue of search and seizure. The court held that Olmstead and Finch,
as participants in an ongoing conspiracy, could not properly claim that
their conversations were privileged."7 Even if their conversations quali-
fied for the protection of attorney client privilege, the privilege was lost
for failure to prevent others from discovering what was said. The court
reasoned that "[a] third person is not forbidden to relate a confidential
conversation heard by him. Wire tapping is not a national offense, nor
made so by the statutes of the state of Washington; even so, it would not





On appeal of Olmstead's conviction, the Ninth Circuit agreed that
evidence derived from the wiretaps was admissible. The court held that:
The protection of [the Fourth and Fifth] amendments, however,
has never been extended to the exclusion of evidence obtained by
listening to the conversation of persons at any place or under any
circumstances. The purpose of the amendments is to prevent the
invasion of homes and offices and the seizure of incriminating
116. 7 F.2d 760 (W.D. Wash. 1925), aff'd, 19 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1927), aff'd, 277 U.S.
438 (1928).
117. 7 F2d at 763.
118. Id. This holding reflected the prevailing view of the attorney client privilege at the
time. The court further illustrated its point as follows:
If the conversation referred to had been carried on in the home of the defendant
Olmstead, between him and his attorney, and the conversation had been heard by
trespassers on the premises, it would be competent testimony in support of the
criminal charge. I know of no rule of law or evidence which would exclude it....
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evidence found therein. Whatever may be said of the tapping of
telephone wires as an unethical intrusion upon the privacy of
persons who are suspected of crime, it is not an act which comes
within the letter of the prohibition of constitutional provisions."9
The dissent by Judge Rudkin includes an interesting comparison of
the privacy interests associated with letters in the mail and telephone
conversations. He rejected the analysis that simply looked to whether a
trespass took place when the information was acquired by law enforce-
ment officials. Judge Rudkin realized that the court should look to the
privacy interests at stake in order to decide whether a search warrant is
required before law enforcement officers covertly intrude on the private
exchange of ideas between two parties. Judge Rudkin explained:
In discussing the protection that surrounds a letter deposited in
the mail, in Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (24 L. Ed. 877),
Mr. Justice Field said:
"Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully
guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their
outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties
forwarding them in their own domiciles. The constitutional
guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers
against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their pa-
pers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be.
Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and examined under
like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the thing to be seized, as is required when papers are
subjected to search in one's own household. No law of Congress
can place in the hands of officials connected with the postal ser-
vice any authority to invade the secrecy of letters and such
sealed packages in the mail; and all regulations adopted as to
mail matter of this kind must be in subordination to the great
principle embodied in the Fourth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion."
And it is the contents of the letter, not the mere paper, that is
thus protected. What is the distinction between a message sent
by letter and a message sent by telegraph or by telephone? True,
the one is visible, the other invisible; the one is tangible, the
other intangible; the one is sealed, and the other unsealed; but
these are distinctions without a difference. A person using the
telegraph or telephone is not broadcasting to the world. His
119. 19 E2d at 847.
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conversation is sealed from the public as completely as the
nature of the instrumentalities employed will permit, and no
federal officer or federal agent has a right to take his message
from the wires, in order that it may be used against him. Such a
situation would be deplorable and intolerable, to say the least.
Must the millions of people who use the telephone every day for
lawful purposes have their messages interrupted and intercepted
in this way? Must their personal, private, and confidential
communications to family, friends, and business associates pass
through any such scrutiny on the part of agents, in whose
selection they have no choice, and for the faithful performance
of whose duties they have no security? Agents, whose very
names and official stations are in many instances concealed and
kept from them. If ills such as these must be borne, our
forefathers signally failed in their desire to ordain and establish a
government to secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and
their posterity. 20
After the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, the U.S. Supreme
Court accepted the case on certiorari.'2 ' In a 5-4 decision, the Court held
that the wiretaps were not subject to restrictions imposed by the Fourth
or Fifth Amendments. In reaching this conclusion, the Court observed
that the police set up the wiretaps in the basement of a large office build-
ing and in the street near the homes of some of the defendants.'22
Significantly, the police implemented all of the wiretaps without entry
into the defendants' offices or houses. The Court reasoned that the pro-
tections of the Fourth Amendment cannot be expanded to include
telephone wires "reaching to the whole world from the defendant's
house or office."'23
Rather, the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment is not vio-
lated as against a defendant "unless there has been an official search and
seizure of his person or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible mate-
rial effects or an actual physical invasion of his house 'or curtilage' for
,124the purpose of making a seizure." According to this narrow view of the
Fourth Amendment, there was no search or seizure where the police used
only their sense of hearing and did not enter the house or office of any of
the defendants.125 The Court explained that Congress could "protect the
120. Id. at 849-50 (Rudkin, J., dissenting).
121. Olmstead v. United States, 276 U.S. 609 (1927). The Court agreed to consider only
whether the wiretaps violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
122. 277 U.S. 438, at 456-57 (1928).
123. Id. at 465.
124. Id. at 466.
125. Id. at 464.
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secrecy of telephone messages by making them, when intercepted, in-
admissible in evidence in federal criminal trials, by direct legislation,
and thus, depart from the common law of evidence."'
26
In his dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that the Constitution should
be interpreted broadly so that its protections against governmental
abuses of power can be adapted to a changing world. 27 His famous dis-
sent asserted that:
[The makers of our Constitution] conferred, as against the gov-
ernment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that
right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.1
21
Apart from the constitutional issues of search and seizure, Justice
Brandeis believed that the wiretap evidence was inadmissible because it
was obtained in violation of state statute. He eloquently argued that:
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government of-
ficials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are
commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of
the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law
scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its ex-
ample. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in
the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the
means-to declare that the government may commit crimes in
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would
126. Id. at 465-66. The Court distinguished the protection for letters in the mail as set
out by Ex parte Jackson on the basis that the Fourth Amendment safeguards tangible letters in
the care of a government sanctioned monopoly. However, Fourth Amendment protection does
not extend to intangible conversations carried over the telephone lines. Id. at 464. Moreover,
the Court was unconcerned about the existence of a Washington state statute that prohibited
the interception of messages transmitted via telephone lines. That statute did not expressly
mandate that evidence of intercepted messages is inadmissible in court. Even if the statute had
explicitly done so, state law could not govern the admissibility of evidence in federal court.
Additionally, evidence is not inadmissible at common law even when it was obtained illegally.
Id. at 466-69. And the wiretap did not violate the Fifth Amendment in the absence of any
compulsion to induce the defendants to talk on the telephone. Id. at 462.
127. Id. at 472-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 478.
[Vol. 10:1
The Need for Revisions
bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this
court should resolutely set its face.1
29
B. Early Federal Statutory Limitations on Wiretaps
As originally enacted, section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act of 1934 (hereinafter "section 605") stated:
No person receiving, assisting in receiving, transmitting, or as-
sisting in transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication
by wire or radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning thereof, except through
authorized channels of transmission or reception, to any person
other than the addressee... No person not being authorized by
the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such intercepted communication to any person ...
Before long, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to begin inter-
preting the statute. In Nardone v. United States,3' the defendants were
convicted in federal district court of illegally possessing, concealing, and
smuggling alcohol, as well as related conspiracy offenses. Having con-
ducted wiretaps, federal agents testified in court as to the substance of
the defendant's interstate telephone conversations.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the basis that:
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act provides that no
person who, as an employee, has to do with the sending or re-
ceiving of any interstate communication by wire shall divulge or
publish it or its substance to anyone other than the addressee or
his authorized representative or to authorized fellow employees,
save in response to a subpoena issued by a court of competent
jurisdiction or on demand of other lawful authority; and no per-
son not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted com-
munication to any person..
The Court concluded:
129. Id. at 485.
130. Federal Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, Title VI § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103-
04 (1934) (current version at 47 US.C. § 605 (2000)).
131. 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
132. Id. at 380-81.
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[T]he plain words of [section] 605 forbid anyone, unless author-
ized by the sender, to intercept a telephone message, and direct
in equally clear language that "no person" shall divulge or pub-
lish the message or its substance to "any person." To recite the
contents of the message in testimony before a court is to divulge
the message. The conclusion that the act forbids such testimony
seems to us unshaken by the government's arguments. 33
While Nardone held that evidence of illegally wiretapped interstate
telephone calls was inadmissible in federal court, Weiss v. United
States3 4 went a step further in holding that section 605 also banned the
wiretapping of intrastate telephone calls. Accordingly, evidence obtained
through an illegal wiretap of an intrastate phone call was likewise inad-
missible in federal court.'35 And in Benanti v. United States,36 the
Supreme Court held that section 605 required the exclusion of wiretap
evidence in federal court even though state law enforcement officers
conducted the wiretap pursuant to a search warrant that was properly
issued under state law.
137
However, section 605 did not entirely preclude consideration of
wiretap evidence in federal court. For example, a person who did not
participate in a wiretapped conversation lacked standing to object to the
admissibility of evidence obtained through the wiretap. 38 If a participant
consented to a wiretap, evidence of the conversation was admissible as
against the other party to the conversation even though that person was
unaware of the wiretap. 
39
The Supreme Court held in Schwartz v. Texas that section 605 was
not applicable to the states, so that state law determined whether wiretap
evidence was admissible in state court.' 40 Thus, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals held in 1953 that a telephone operator who eaves-
dropped on a conversation between an attorney and his client could
testify at trial where the client was accused of murdering his ex-wife."" It
133. Id. at 382.
134. 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
135. Id. at 326-31.
136. 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
137. Id. at 104-05.
138. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 121 (1942).
139. Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 110-11 (1957).
140. 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952).
141. Clark v. State, 261 S.W.2d 339, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1953). At the time, state law
did not exclude evidence that was obtained by eavesdropping. Although Texas courts recog-
nized the attorney client privilege, the attorney and client were held responsible to ensure that
their conversations were not overheard. if an eavesdropper succeeded in overhearing a confi-
dential conversation between attorney and client, that eavesdropper could testify in court as to
what was said. Id. at 342. Even though the telephone operator violated telephone company
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was not until 1968 that the Supreme Court expressly overruled Schwartz,
holding that section 605 was applicable to the states.'
42
In spite of the plain language of section 605, federal authorities con-
ducted wiretaps in furtherance of foreign intelligence activities, arguing
that such activities were not entirely prohibited. The Department of Jus-
tice and the FBI also engaged in wiretapping associated with
investigations of domestic crimes on the theory that section 605 did not
proscribe wiretapping per se, but prohibited wiretapping followed by
"divulgence." They took the position that there was no divulgence for
purposes of section 605 when a governmental official passed the infor-
mation on to another.
43
V. MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROTECTIONS FOR WIRE,
ORAL, AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
A. Modem Fourth Amendment Limitations
on Telephone Wiretaps
Section 605 governed the admissibility of wiretap evidence in fed-
eral court. But other forms of electronic eavesdropping fell outside the
scope of the statute. Under the rationale of Olmstead, these alternative
forms of eavesdropping did not amount to a search for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes in the absence of a physical trespass. As a result, new
electronic eavesdropping technologies went essentially unregulated.'"
For example, Goldman v. United States"5 held that evidence obtained
by federal law enforcement officers was admissible where the officers
were lawfully present in an office and placed a "detectaphone" against a
wall in order to overhear a conversation in the next room. On Lee v.
United States'14 held that evidence acquired by federal agents was admis-
sible where they hid a microphone on a person who entered the
defendant's home with his consent.
48
policy by eavesdropping on a telephone conversation, her testimony was admissible and the
defendant was sentenced to death. This case demonstrates that as recently as the 1950s, use of
the telephone for sensitive communications could be a dangerous practice.
142. Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 385 (1968). Ultimately, Lee had little impact because
it was decided just two days before enactment of the Federal Wiretap Act of 1968, discussed
infra at Part VB, which provided new regulation of electronic eavesdropping. 2 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 2d ed. § 4.1(b), at 329-30 (2d ed. 1999).
143. 2 LAFAVE ET AL, supra note 142, § 4.1(b), at 328-29.
144. Id. § 4.1(c), at 330.
145. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
146. Id. at 131-33.
147. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
148. Id. at 751-58.
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But the Supreme Court began to take a more expansive view of the
Fourth Amendment during the 1960s. In Silverman v. United States,'
49
the police placed a "spike mike" (a microphone with a spike attached to
it, along with an amplifier, power pack, and earphones) into the common
wall of a row house until it made contact with a heating duct. The spike
mike enabled the police to overhear the conversations of the occupants
of the adjacent house."'5 The Supreme Court held that evidence of the
conversations was inadmissible without consideration of whether the
police had committed a technical trespass under local property law. 5 '
Subsequently, Wong Sun v. United States'2 expressly recognized that the
Fourth Amendment offers protection against police efforts to overhear
conversations as well as protection against the seizure of tangible
items. 13
In 1967, the Supreme Court established the presently accepted stan-
dard for Fourth Amendment protection in Katz v. United States. 54 There,
the FBI attached an electronic device to the exterior of a telephone booth
in order to monitor and record the defendant's side of several telephone
conversations concerning illegal gambling activities. ' 5 The Court held
that tape recordings of the conversations were inadmissible in evidence
because:
[Tihe underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so
eroded by our subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine
there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling. The
Government's activities in electronically listening to and re-
cording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which
he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus
constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.156
Katz made clear that that the Fourth Amendment places limits on the
implementation of technology for purposes of eavesdropping by law en-
forcement officers in the absence of consent by one of the parties to the
149. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
150. Id. at 506-07.
151. Id. at 511-12.
152. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
153. Id. at 485.
154. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
155. Id. at 348.
156. Id. at 353. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion explained that Fourth Amendment
protections are invoked when "a person [has] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'rea-
sonable.'" Id. at 361.
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conversation.'5 7 The extent of these limits as applied to telephone wire-
tapping was spelled out in great detail by Berger v. New York.'
58
Berger addressed the constitutionality of a New York statute setting
out an ex parte procedure for judicial authorization of electronic eaves-
dropping. The statute was found to be in violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments for several reasons. First, the statute did not
require the search warrant to sufficiently describe the crime under inves-
tigation, nor "the place to be searched" nor "the persons or things to be
seized". 59 Second, the statute did not require a sufficiently "precise and
discriminate" description of the conversations that the police wanted to
monitor. '6° Third, the statute authorized eavesdropping for an extended
period of time that was deemed to violate the requirement of prompt
execution.' 6' Fourth, the statute permitted extension of the time period
without sufficient showing of probable cause for the continuation.
6 2
Fifth, the statute did not require termination of the eavesdropping when
the police overheard the conversation they were waiting for. 63 Sixth, the
statute did not require a showing of exigent circumstances which are
necessary to overcome the secrecy and lack of notice that are necessarily
associated with wiretapping. '64 Lastly, the statute lacked any provision
for a return of service on the warrant to account for the records of con-
versations that had been overheard.
65
B. Modem Federal Statutory Limitations on Telephone
Wiretaps and Interception of Email
1. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 Amends Section 605
By the time of Katz and Berger, it was generally agreed that the pro-
hibition against interception and divulgence of telephone conversations
as mandated by section 605 needed to be reassessed.' Accordingly, Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Federal
Wiretap Act) 167 was enacted at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 in order to strike a
157. 2 LAFAVE ET AL, supra note 142, § 4.1(c), at 331.
158. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
159. Id. at 55-56.
160. Id. at 56-59.
161. Id. at 59.
162. Id. at 59.
163. Id. at 59-60.
164. Id. at60.
165. Id.
166. 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 142, § 4.2(a), at 332.
167. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (Supp. V
1965-1969)).
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new balance between the right to privacy and the needs of law enforce-
ment. Section 605 was amended to create exceptions to its prohibition
against interception and divulgence of wire communications. 1' Thus, the
statutory regulation of wiretaps shifted from section 605 to the Federal
Wiretap Act.
According to the new provisions, the willful interception of oral or
wire communication was prohibited except as permitted therein. Section
2511 as originally enacted stated:
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any
person who-
(a) willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any
other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire or
oral communication;
(c) willfully discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other
person the contents of any wire or oral communication, knowing
or having reason to know that the information was obtained
through the interception of a wire or oral communication in vio-
lation of this subsection;
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.1
69
Section 2510 defined wire and oral communications as follows:
As used in this chapter-
(1) "wire communication" means any communication made in
whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission
of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like con-
nection between the point of origin and the point of reception
furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common car-
rier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission
of interstate or foreign communications;
(2) "oral communication" means any oral communication ut-
tered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such
168. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 803, 82 Stat. 197, 223.
169. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (Supp. V 1965-1969).
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communication is not subject to interception under circum-
stances justifying such expectation.'70
Section 2515 of the Federal Wiretap Act added an exclusionary rule
stating:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted,
no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence
derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial ...
before any court ... of the United States, a State, or a political
subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information would
be in violation of this chapter.
7
'
The Federal Wiretap Act spells out the criteria that must be estab-
lished before a court can authorize the interception of a wire or oral
communication by law enforcement officials. To ensure compliance with
the holding of Berger, these criteria go beyond the showing necessary to
obtain a search warrant pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
41 and 18 U.S.C. § 3103a.
As originally enacted, section 2516(1) empowered the Attorney
General, Deputy Attorney General, and certain other officials to ask a fed-
eral judge for authorization to intercept wire or oral communications
pursuant to an investigation of specifically enumerated crimes. The inter-
ception was to be accomplished by a federal agency with responsibility for
investigating the offense that was thought to have been committed. 7 2
Similarly, section 2516(2) granted authority in conformance with
federal as well as state law for the principal prosecutor of any state or
county to ask a state judge for permission to intercept wire or oral com-
munications. Once again, the federal statute required the interception to
be accomplished by the appropriate law enforcement agency, and limited




A judge can issue an interception order only in accordance with sec-
tion 2518, whose provisions are summarized by LaFave, Israel, and King
as follows:
An interception order may be issued only if the judge determines
on the basis of facts submitted that there is probable cause for
belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is
about to commit one of the enumerated offenses; probable cause
170. Id. § 2510.
171. Id. § 2515.
172. Id. § 2516(1).
173. Id. § 2516(2).
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for belief that particular communications concerning that offense
will be obtained through such interception; that normal investi-
gative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;
and probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, or
the place where, the communications are to be intercepted are
being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the
commission of such offense, or are leased to, listed in the name
of, or commonly used by such person. Each interception order
must specify the identity of the person, if known, whose com-
munications are to be intercepted; the nature and location of the
communications facilities as to which, or the place where, au-
thority to intercept is granted; a particular description of the type
of communication sought to be intercepted; and a statement of
the particular offense to which it relates; the identity of the
agency authorized to intercept the communications and of the
person authorizing the application; and the period of time during
which such interception is authorized, including a statement as
to whether or not the interception shall automatically terminate
when the described communication has been first obtained. No
order may permit interception "for any period longer than is
necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in
any event longer than thirty days." Extensions of an order may
be granted for like periods, but only by resort to the procedures
required in obtaining the initial order.
74
The Federal Wiretap Act permits interception before obtaining judi-
cial authorization in emergencies. But the interception must terminate
within 48 hours or as soon as the communication sought is obtained
unless further interception is approved by a judge.17' The Act mandates
the judge to ensure that the target of the interception is served with an
inventory providing notice of the interception within 90 days after com-
pletion of the surveillance.1
6
The Federal Wiretap Act originally contained language indicating
that its provisions did not limit the constitutional power of the president
to deal with matters such as foreign intelligence and national security.
7
This provision was repealed upon enactment of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978.78
174. 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 142, § 4.2(a), at 333.
175. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (2000).
176. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (Supp. V 1965-1969).
178. 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 142, § 4.3(d), at 362-63.
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2. Early Difficulties in Applying the Federal Wiretap
Act to New Telephone Technologies such as Mobile
Telephones and Cordless Telephones
Of course, the Federal Wiretap Act went into force before cellular
telephones'79 and cordless telephones 0 became widely accepted. Al-
though mobile telephones ' (the predecessor of cellular phones) had
existed for many years, they were not in widespread use. But it was not
long before the Federal Wiretap Act's definitions of "oral communica-
tion" and "wire communication" led the courts to struggle with the
interpretation of the statute in light of new telephone technologies.
For example, U.S. v. Hall involved defendants who conducted con-
versations over mobile telephones that were installed in two cars."'
Some of their conversations were overheard by a private individual using
a common eight-band radio that was readily available for purchase by
the general public.
83
The eavesdropper considered the conversations to be suspicious and
continued to listen in for about a month before notifying the police, who
began to monitor further conversations without judicial authorization.
The defendants were eventually arrested by state law enforcement
179. Senate Report No. 99-541 regarding the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 briefly explains cellular technology as follows:
In a cellular radiotelephone system, large service areas are divided into honeycomb-
shaped segments or "cells"-each of which is equipped with a low-power transmit-
ter or base station which can receive and radiate messages within its parameters.
When a caller dials a number on a cellular telephone, a transceiver sends signals
over the air on a radio frequency to a cell site. From there the signal travels over
phone lines or a microwave to a computerized mobile telephone switching office
("MTSO") or station. The MTSO automatically and inaudibly switches the conver-
sation from one base station and one frequency to another as the portable telephone,
typically in a motor vehicle, moves from cell to cell.
S. REP. No. 99-541, at 9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3563.
180. A cordless telephone consists of a hand-held mobile unit and a base unit. The
speaker's voice is converted into radio waves and travels from the mobile unit to the base unit.
The base unit in turn transmits the speaker's voice to the receiving party through ordinary
telephone lines. Conversely, the incoming caller's voice is transmitted through the phone lines
to the base unit, from which it travels to the mobile unit via radio waves. State v. Delaurier,
488 A.2d 688, 690 (R.I. 1985).
181. As early as 1949, the Federal Communications Commission allocated a small num-
ber of frequencies for mobile phones. Rather than employing multiple cells that each contain a
transmitter, an individual transmitter served a 75 square mile area. Often, a single transmitter
served an entire city. Therefore, the mobile phone industry was quite restricted. See Timothy
R. Rabel, Comment, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Discriminatory Treatment
for Similar Technology, Cutting the Cord of Privacy, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 661, 662
(1990).
182. 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973).
183. Id. at 194-95.
184. Id. at 195.
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officers and turned over to federal authorities for prosecution. They were
convicted of possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute it. The
defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that evidence of their
telephone conversations should have been suppressed.' 5
The Ninth Circuit had to decide whether a conversation over a mo-
bile phone should be viewed as a wire communication that must be
suppressed at trial, or an oral communication that need be suppressed
only if the participants had a reasonable expectation that their conversa-
tion was not subject to interception. 16 This decision was complicated by
the lack of guidance in the legislative history of the Federal Wiretap
Act. 187
The court interpreted the statute to require that when one side of a
conversation takes place over a wire telephone and the other side utilizes
a mobile telephone, the conversation must be treated as a wire communi-
cation that should be suppressed in the absence of judicial authorization
to conduct a wiretap.18 In contrast, a conversation taking place over two
mobile telephones would be treated as an oral communication that need
be suppressed only if the parties reasonably believed that their conversa-
tion would not be intercepted.8 9 The case was remanded to the district
court for further findings as to whether certain conversations should be
regarded as "oral" or "wire," and whether the parties to any oral commu-
nication had a reasonable expectation of privacy. '90
A federal district court came to a different conclusion under similar
circumstances in Edwards v. Bardwell.'9' There, Edwards used the mo-
bile phone in his car to contact his attorney on the attorney's wire
telephone. Their conversation about a criminal matter pending against
Edwards was overheard by a private party using a scanner that could be
easily obtained by the general public. The intercepted conversation was
tape recorded and the tape was given to the U.S. Attorney's Office in the
Middle District of Louisiana. There, U.S. Attorney Bardwell listened to
the tape and contacted the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Lou-
isiana, who refused to listen to the tape and notified Edwards' attorney
about its existence. Edwards filed suit against U.S. Attorney Bardwell
and the person who intercepted his conversation pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
185. Id. at 194-95.
186. Id. at 196.
187. Id. at 197-98.
188. Id. at 196-99.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 198. The district court had already made findings that two of the defendants
were aware that conversations involving a mobile telephone could be overheard. Therefore,
their conversations taking place over two mobile phones need not be suppressed. Id.
191. 632 F Supp. 584 (M.D. La. 1986).
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§ 2520, which creates a civil cause of action against anyone who
wrongly intercepts or discloses a wire or oral communication.'
92
The district court disagreed with the reasoning of Hall, stating that:
With all deference to the Ninth Circuit, this court considers that
when either end of a communication originates over a radio
telephone, that conversation is an "oral" communication and the
fact that the communication travels in part on a line to a land-
line telephone and back to a radio transmitter does not convert it
to a "wire" communication. There is no reasonable expectation
of privacy in a communication which is broadcast by radio in all
directions to be overheard by countless people who have pur-
chased and daily use receiving devices such as a "bearcat"
scanner or who happen to have another mobile radio telephone
tuned to the same frequency.
93
The court held that neither the interception of the conversation nor
the disclosure to the U.S. Attorney violated the Federal Wiretap Act. Ac-
cordingly, Edwards' suit was dismissed on summary judgment.' 94
While Hall and Edwards considered the application of the Federal
Wiretap Act to interception of mobile telephone conversations, other
courts faced similar issues involving portable telephone conversations. In
State v. Howard,95 a neighbor's AM/FM radio picked up the defendant's
cordless telephone conversations. 96 The neighbor recognized the
speaker's voice and recorded some of the conversations, which involved
illegal drugs. The neighbor told the police, and agreed to record any ad-
ditional conversations that he heard over his radio. The defendant was
eventually arrested and charged with several drug offenses. At trial, the
judge suppressed evidence of the telephone conversations and also sup-
pressed evidence obtained from a search of the defendant's home. The
State filed an interlocutory appeal.' 97
The Supreme Court of Kansas ruled that:
[T]he term "wire communication," as defined in 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2510(1), should be construed to apply only to that portion of a
radio-telephone communication which is actually transmitted by
the wire and not broadcast in a manner available to the public. We
hold that those portions of the cordless telephone conversations
192. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2000).
193. 632 F.Supp. at 589.
194. Id.
195. 679 P.2d 197 (Kan. 1984).
196. Id. at 198.
197. Id.
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intercepted by an ordinary FM radio in this case did not fall into
the category of a "wire communication," but were in fact oral
communications and that the rules pertaining to the interception
of oral communications prescribed in Title III are applicable.'98
The court further held that the defendant did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the broadcast portion of the conversation be-
cause the cordless telephone owner's manual fully explained the nature
of the telephone.' 99 Based on this analysis, the court concluded that evi-
dence of the telephone conversations was admissible at trial.2°°
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reached the same conclusion
under a similar fact pattern in State v. Delaurier.20 ' The court rejected the
reasoning of Hall and agreed with the conclusion in Howard to the effect
that the broadcast portion of a portable telephone conversation is an oral
communication as defined by the Federal Wiretap Act.20 2
But the court did not reach the question of whether the defendant
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his oral communication.
Rather, the court focused on the Federal Wiretap Act's prohibition of the
interception of wire and oral communications, relying on 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(4)'s definition of "interception" as "the aural acquisition of the
contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any elec-
tronic, mechanical, or other device. 2 °3 The court held that an ordinary
radio, which picked up the portable telephone broadcasts, was not a "de-
vice" as defined by the statute. 2 4 Therefore, all other issues become
moot and the evidence was admissible.
The decisions in Hall, Edwards, Howard, and Delaurier all strug-
gled with the need to categorize a broadcast communication as either
"wire" or "oral." If oral, then the court had to determine whether the par-
ties had a reasonable expectation that the communication was not subject
to interception (except for Delaurier, which avoided this issue). Because
the drafters of the Federal Wiretap Act did not anticipate the rapid
growth of wireless technologies, the courts were forced to apply a statute
that was becoming increasingly out of date.
198. Id. at 206.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985).
202. Id. at 693-94.
203. Id. at 695.
204. Id. at 693-95.
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3. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amends
the Federal Wiretap Act to Protect the Privacy of
"Electronic Communications"
a. The Privacy of Cellular Telephone Conversations and Email Falls
Within the Protection of the Statute as Amended
In 1986, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)205
amended the Federal Wiretap Act to extend privacy protections to "elec-
tronic" communications such as email while redefining "wire" and
"oral" communications. The statutory amendments established a privacy
interest for parties to cellular telephone conversations, but created seri-
ous ambiguities as to the extent of protection afforded to email and other
emerging forms of communication.
18 U.S.C. § 2511 as amended by the ECPA states:
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any
person who-
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures
any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire,
oral, or electronic communication;
(b) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other
person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communica-
tion, knowing or having reason to know that the information was
obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic
communication in violation of this subsection;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall be
subject to suit as provided in subsection (5). 206
18 U.S.C. § 2510 as amended by the ECPA states:
As used in this chapter-
(1) "wire communication" means any aural transfer made in
whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission
of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like
connection between the point of origin and the point of reception
(including the use of such connection in a switching station)
205. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
206. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (Supp. IV 1986).
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furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or
operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or
foreign communications or communications affecting interstate
or foreign commerce and such term includes any electronic
storage of such communication, but such term does not include
the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication that is
transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base
unit;
(2) "oral communication" means any oral communication ut-
tered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such
communication is not subject to interception under circum-
stances justifying such expectation, but such term does not
include any electronic communication;
(12) "electronic communication" means any transfer of signs,
signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any na-
ture transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that af-
fects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include-
(A) the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication that
is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the
base unit;
(B) any wire or oral communication .. 207
The amended version of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) effectively included
cellular telephone conversations within the definition of "wire communi-
cation" and so prohibited the interception of cellular telephone
conversations without judicial authorization. The legislative history of
the ECPA declares:
[18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) as amended] specifies that the use of wire,
cable or other similar connections for the transmission of com-
munications includes the use of such connections in a switching
station. This subparagraph makes clear that cellular communica-
tions-whether they are between two cellular telephones or a
cellular telephone and a "land line" telephone are included in the
definition of "wire communications" and are covered by the
207. 18 U.S.C § 2510 (Supp. IV 1986).
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statute. As noted below, the bill distinguishes between cordless
and cellular telephones." 8
While creating a statutory privacy interest in cell phone conversa-
tions, the 1986 amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) expressly excluded
the "radio portion of a cordless telephone communication transmitted
between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit" from the defi-
nition of a wire communication. The Senate Report explained the
rationale for this distinction, asserting that "[b]ecause communications
made on some cordless telephones can be intercepted easily with readily
available technologies, such as an AM radio, it would be inappropriate to
make the interception of such a communication a criminal offense. The
wire portion of a cordless communication remains fully covered, how-
ever.
2 9
Likewise, the 1986 amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) effectively
removed the radio portion of a cordless telephone conversation from the
definition of oral communication. Senate Report 99-541 explains that
Congress disapproved of the analysis in cases such as Howard, which
offered protection if the court found that the participants had a reason-
able expectation of privacy in a cordless telephone conversation. The
Senate Report goes on to assert:
[18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) defining "oral communications" is
amended] to exclude electronic communications. There have
been cases involving radio communications in which the court,
having determined that the radio communication was not a wire
communication then analyzes it in privacy terms to determine if
it is an oral communication. The bill rejects that analysis by ex-
cluding electronic communications from the definition of oral
communications.
An oral communication is an utterance by a person under cir-
cumstances exhibiting an expectation that the communication is
not subject to interception, under circumstances justifying such
an expectation. In essence, an oral communication is one carried
• --. 210
by sound waves, not by an electronic medium.
Lastly, the 1986 amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) expressly re-
moved the radio portion of a cordless telephone conversation from the
definition of electronic communication. Thus, the radio portion of a
208. S. REP. No. 99-541, supra note 179, at 11, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3565.
209. Id. at 12, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3566.
210. Id. at 13, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3567.
211. Id. at 14, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3568.
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cordless telephone conversation was excluded from statutory protection
as a wire, oral, or electronic communication.
b. Although the Privacy of Electronic Communication is Protected by
Statute, it does not Receive the Same Level of Protection
as is Afforded to Wire Communication
Although the Federal Wiretap Act provides similar protection for
wire, oral, and electronic communications, there are additional protec-
tions afforded to wire and oral communications that are not applicable to
electronic communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) permits only certain
designated high-ranking Justice Department officials to request authori-
zation to intercept wire or oral communications as part of the
investigation of an extensive list of specifically enumerated offenses.2' 2
In contrast, 18 U.S.C. § 2516(3) permits a wider range of government
attorneys to request authorization for the interception of electronic
communications as part of the investigation of any federal felony.
It is significant to note that the ECPA did not update the statutory
exclusionary rule of 18 U.S.C. § 2515, which makes evidence of wire or
oral communications intercepted in violation of the Federal Wiretap Act
inadmissible in court.14 Therefore, the statutory exclusionary rule does
not extend to electronic communications.2 5 In the absence of a statutory
exclusionary rule, illegally intercepted electronic communications are
subject only to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.
As a result, electronic communications receive less protection than
wire communications in that illegal interception by private parties would
not result in suppression under Fourth Amendment analysis, which only
limits the actions of government officers. Moreover, some electronic
communications that are illegally intercepted by government officers may
be admissible under Fourth Amendment analysis due to the good faith
exception to the constitutional exclusionary rule.2' 6 But even in the absence
of a statutory exclusionary rule applicable to electronic communication,
evidence of illegally intercepted electronic communications may never-
theless be inadmissible in court. 18 U.S.C. §2511(l)(c) provides
212. 18 U.S.C. 2516 (1) (2000).
213. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(3).
214. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1982) with 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (Supp. IV 1986) (relevant
language unchanged).
215. S. REP. No. 99-541, supra note 179, at 23, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3577.
216. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468
U.S. 981 (1984). Michael Leib makes a convincing argument for amending the statutory ex-
clusionary rule to treat electronic communication in the same manner as wire and oral
communications. Michael Leib, E-mail and the Wiretap Laws: Why Congress Should Add
Electronic Communication to Titie Ill's Statutory Exclusionary Rule and Expressly Reject a
"Good Faith" Exception, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393 (1997).
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criminal penalties for disclosure of the contents of an illegally inter-
.• 211
cepted electronic communication. It follows that a court should not
play a role in the commission of a crime by permitting witness testimony
that violates a criminal statute.2 8
As will be discussed in Section V.C., infra, electronic communica-
tions that have reached their destination and are held in electronic
storage no longer receive the protection of the Federal Wiretap Act.
Rather, the statutory scheme as interpreted by the courts distinguishes
between the illegal interception of electronic communications during
transmission and unlawful access to an electronic communication held in
storage by a provider of electronic communication services. These stored
electronic communications are governed by the far lesser protections of
the Stored Communications Act.
4. The Telephone Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act, Followed by
the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Further
Amend the Federal Wiretap Act to Provide Additional Protection for
Cellular Telephone Conversations and to
Protect Cordless Telephone Conversations
As the use of wireless technology became more widespread, Con-
gress enacted additional legislation to further protect the privacy of
people conducting conversations over cellular and cordless telephones.
Section 403 of the Telephone Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act of
1992,"9 codified at 47 U.S.C. § 302a, ordered the Federal Communica-
tions Commission to issue regulations prohibiting the manufacture or
importation of radio scanners that have the ability to receive cellular
telephone transmissions.
In 1994, section 202 of the Communications Assistance for Law En-
forcement Act (CALEA) 22° amended 18 U.S.C. § 2510 by deleting the
language that excluded the radio portion of cordless telephone commu-
nications from the protection of the statute. Although the statute does not
expressly state that the radio portion of cordless telephone conversations
falls within its protections, House Report 103-827 explains that "[t]he
protections of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 are
217. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1)(c) (2000).
218. David Hricik, Lawyers Worry Too Much About Transmitting Client Confidences by
Internet E-Mail, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 477 (1998). See also Nardone, 302 U.S at 276
(discussing section 605's prohibition against divulging the contents of a wiretapped conversa-
tion "[t]o recite the contents of the message in testimony before a court is to divulge the
message").
219. Pub. L. No. 102-556, § 403, 106 Stat. 4181, 4195 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 302a (Supp. V 1993)).
220. Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 202, 108 Stat. at 4290 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2510
(1994)).
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extended to cordless phones. 22 This intention is repeated later in the
report as well 2
However, the 1994 amendments do not make clear whether the radio
portion of a cordless telephone communication should be treated as an
oral, wire, or electronic communication. An interesting law review note
points out that ambiguity in the Federal Wiretap Act leaves this question
221
open. Moreover, the Federal Wiretap Act leaves open the possibility
that older cordless telephones based on early technology that uninten-
tional interception may remain unprotected. 4 Logically, one would
expect the radio portion of a cordless telephone conversation to be
treated like a cellular telephone conversation and characterized as a wire
communication. But the statutory scheme is not known for its logic.
Despite its flaws, the history of the Federal Wiretap Act regarding
cellular and cordless telephones provides an interesting demonstration of
the manner in which technology and law combine to establish a right of
privacy. Hall, Edwards, Howard, and Delaurier illustrate the view that
communications over a media deemed to be subject to easy and acciden-
tal interception are not worthy of a legally recognized privacy interest.
Nevertheless, the ECPA amended the Federal Wiretap Act to create a
right of privacy in cellular telephone conversations. Subsequently, the
Telephone Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act of 1992 ordered a ban
on the manufacture and importation of devices that are capable of
intercepting cellular telephone communications. Similarly, the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act amended the
Federal Wiretap Act to create a privacy right in the broadcast portion of
cordless telephone communications. Thus, it can be argued that the
privacy of telephone conversations does not really originate from the
technological security of the media of communication. Rather, privacy
emanates from the statutes and judicial decisions that prohibit the
interception of communications without judicial authorization and
mandate criminal and civil penalties for anyone who intentionally
intrudes on that privacy interest.
225
Such an assertion may seem counter-intuitive. Most people probably
assume that their conversations over a wire telephone are secure and will
not be intercepted, though they feel somewhat less certain about portable
221. H. REP. No. 103-827 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3490.
222. Id., reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3497-98.
223. Basil W. Mangano, Note, The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
and Protection of Cordless Telephone Conversations: The Use of Technology as a Guide to
Privacy, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 99 (1996).
224. Id. at 116-17.
225. See Albert Gidari, Privilege and Confidentiality in Cyberspace, 13 COMPUTER LAW.
1 (Feb. 1996).
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telephone conversations due to the nature of the technologies. Yet none
of our common methods of communication are truly secure in the sense
that third parties are physically unable to intercept our conversations. For
example, it is relatively easy to obtain telephone wiretapping equip-
ment.226
Of course, one could argue that the parties to a sensitive communica-
tion should employ technology that will prevent others from learning the
contents of their messages. For example, sensitive communications can
be encrypted, or scrambled, so that an unauthorized third party who in-
tercepts a message cannot make sense of it. Such practices would be a
prudent security precaution in many business situations. But exclusive
reliance on technology without a legal assurance of privacy leads to an
"arms race" in which the measure of security is no more than the ability
of encryption software to defeat decryption software.227 On the other
hand, a privacy right that is founded in law will offer protection regard-
less of leadership in the "arms race" at any given time even though some
people will inevitably violate the law at the risk of civil and criminal
penalties.
This is not to say that it would be good policy to create a statutory
right of privacy in media of communication that are so insecure that
communications are often intercepted by accident.22 8 But once a privacy
right is created by statute or judicial decision, the protections should be
the same regardless of the medium of communication. Thus, letters in
the mail, telephone conversations, and email should all receive the same
level of protection from surreptitious interception by law enforcement
officers or private parties.
As has been shown, letters in the mail receive less protection under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41229 and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3103a230
than telephone calls are afforded under the Federal Wiretap Act. Like-
wise, the Federal Wiretap Act provides email with less protection from
governmental intrusion than is provided to telephone calls. These dis-
tinctions cannot be justified. When the police surreptitiously learn the
226. For example, as of January 2004 a search on any internet search engine returns
thousands of pages selling wiretap equipment.
227. The use of encryption software does not create a reasonable expectation of privacy
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace:
Can Encryption Create a "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?," 33 CoNN L. REv. 503
(2001).
228. Cordless phones are evolving to lessen the likelihood that the broadcast portion of a
conversation will be accidentally intercepted. For example, cordless phones now broadcast on
frequencies that will not be picked up on conventional radios. United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d
171, 177-79 (5th Cir. 1992).
229. FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 41 (2003).
230. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3103a (Supp. 2003).
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contents of a communication, they intrude upon the same privacy interest
regardless of the medium of communication. Therefore, the same protec-
tions should apply.
C. Inconsistent Statutory Provisions Lead to Confusion
about Interception of Email during Transmission and
Access to Email in Storage; Additional Confusion
about Access to Voicemail
Part V.B.3., supra, explained that the ECPA extended some, but not
all, Federal Wiretap Act protections to electronic communications.
Moreover, the ECPA added Chapter 121 to Title 18 of the U.S. Code."'
Chapter 121 is commonly known as the Stored Communications Act. It
governs voicemail and email that is held in electronic storage for the re-
cipient. Thus, the statutes draw a distinction between intercepting a wire
or electronic communication while it is in transmission and intruding
upon that same communication once it has reached its destination and is
held in electronic storage.
18 U.S.C. § 2701 as added by the ECPA states:
(a) Offense. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section
whoever-
(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility
through which an electronic communication service is provided;
or
(2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility;
and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a
wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic stor-
age in such system shall be punished as provided by subsection
(b) of this section."'
The Stored Communications Act generally prohibits Internet Service
Providers from disclosing the contents of incoming or outgoing email.
18 U.S.C. § 2702 states:
(a) Prohibitions. Except as provided in subsection (b)-
231. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860-68 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2710
(Supp. IV 1986)).
232. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (Supp. IV 1986). The definition of "electronic storage" comes
from the Federal Wiretap Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (Supp. IV 1986) defined electronic stor-
age as "any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental
to the electronic transmission thereof."
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(1) a person or entity providing an electronic communication
service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person
or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic
storage by that service; and
(2) a person or entity providing remote computing service to the
public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the
contents of any communication which is carried or maintained
on that service-
(A) on behalf of, and received by means of electronic transmis-
sion from.... a subscriber or customer of such service; and
(B) solely for the purpose of providing storage or computer
processing services to such subscriber or customer, if the pro-
vider is not authorized to access the contents of any such
communications for purposes of providing any services other
233than storage or computer processing.
The Stored Communications Act requires the Government to obtain
a search warrant in order to compel an Internet Service Provider to dis-
close the contents of an email message held in electronic storage for 180
days or less. The Stored Communications Act provides less protection
for email held in electronic storage for more than 180 days. As an alter-
native to a search warrant, the Government can compel the Internet
Service Provider to disclose the contents of email through an administra-
tive subpoena or court order. 18 U.S.C. § 2703, as it read in 1986 stated:
(a) Contents of electronic communications in electronic storage.
A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider
of electronic communication service of the contents of an elec-
tronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an
electronic communications service for one hundred and eighty
days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure or equivalent State warrant. A gov-
ernmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of
electronic communications services of the contents of an elec-
tronic communication that has been in electronic storage in an
electronic communications system for more than one hundred
and eighty days by the means available under subsection (b) of
this section.
(b) Contents of electronic communications in a remote comput-
ing service.
233. 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2000).
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(1) A governmental entity may require a provider of remote
computing service to disclose the contents of any electronic
communication....
(A) without required notice to the subscriber or customer, if the
governmental entity obtains a warrant issued under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure or equivalent State warrant; or
(B) with prior notice from the governmental entity to the sub-
scriber or customer if the governmental entity-
(i) uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or
State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena; or
(ii) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection
(d) of this section;
except that delayed notice may be given pursuant to section
2705 of this title.3
Criminal penalties for violation of the statute are set out in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2701(b)21 and civil damages are authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 2707.236
But 18 U.S.C. § 2708237 expressly precludes any other remedies or sanc-
tions for nonconstitutional violations of the statute. Significantly, the
Stored Communications Act has no statutory exclusionary rule. There-
fore, evidence obtained in violation of the Stored Communications Act is
arguably admissible in court unless a constitutional exclusionary rule is
implicated. The better view would prevent the introduction of any evi-
dence obtained in violation of the Stored Communications Act, but the
Act's exclusive remedies provision may weaken this position.238
The search warrant provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2518 under the Federal
Wiretap Act and 18 U.S.C. § 2703 under the Stored Communications
Act lead to significant distinctions between the protection afforded to
email while in transmission and the protection afforded to email that is
in storage in the recipient's mailbox at his Internet Service Provider. For
example, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) permits law enforcement officers to sur-
reptitiously intercept email when they have received judicial
authorization based on, inter alia, probable cause and a showing that
234. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (Supp. IV 1986).
235. Id. § 2701(b).
236. Id. § 2707.
237. Id. § 2708.
238. Nevertheless, one can envision situations where the courts would refuse to permit
the introduction of evidence obtained in violation of the statute even in the absence of a con-
stitutional violation. For example, privileged information obtained in violation of the statute
should not be admissible regardless of the exclusive remedies provision of the Stored Com-
munications Act. See Gidari, supra note 225, at 2.
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normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or that
they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or that they are
239too dangerous to even try.
But according to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), law enforcement officers can
search email stored in a person's mailbox for 180 days or less at an ISP
pursuant to a search warrant "issued using the procedures described in
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." Therefore, the search can be
conducted surreptitiously through compliance with Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41 and 18 U.S.C. § 3103a,2 40 which does not require
consideration of alternative investigative techniques before conducting a
covert search.24'
Rather, 18 U.S.C. § 3 103a authorizes delayed notice of the execution
of a search warrant if the court believes that contemporaneous notice
would lead to an "adverse result," the warrant prohibits a seizure unless
the court believes that the seizure is justified by reasonable necessity,
and the warrant requires that notice be given within a reasonable time.242
This "adverse result" standard does not require the court to make any
finding about the possibility of employing less intrusive investigative
techniques as an alternative to the covert search of stored email.243 Such a
finding would be required by 18 U.S.C. § 25 18(3) if the police sought to
intercept email during transmission. Moreover, other safeguards that are
expressly spelled out by the Federal Wiretap Act governing interception
of email during transmission are not included in the Stored Communica-
tions Act.'"
There is no logical reason to provide greater protection against cov-
ert police surveillance for an email in transmission than for the same
239. 18 U.S.C. 2518(3) (2000).
240. See supra Part II.B. and text accompanying note 60. The Justice Department takes
the position that it need not comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3103a in order to conduct the search
without notice to the holder of the mailbox. The Justice Department theorizes that the statute
merely requires notice to the Internet Service Provider. COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY SECTION, CRIM. Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COM-
PUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, § III. D. 5
(July 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/s&smanual2002.htm (last
visited June 16, 2003)[hereinafter SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS]. This issue is dis-
cussed further in part V.C. 1., infra.
241. If the email has been in the recipient's mailbox for more than 180 days, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2703 and 2705 allow law enforcement officers to conduct a surreptitious search pursuant to
a subpoena or court order (rather than a search warrant) without consideration of alternative
investigative techniques.
242. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3103a governs covert searches in general, adding more confusion to
the issue. It is unclear whether intangibles such as email can be seized. See 4 LAFAVE, supra
note 12, § 2.1(a), at 378.
243. See supra note 60.
244. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2000) (setting out detailed procedures) with 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703 (2000) (exhibiting lesser safeguards).
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email after it has reached the recipient's mailbox at his Internet Service
Provider. In this regard, the statutory scheme lacks a coherent frame-
work.245
It seems that the drafters of the statute were unable to anticipate a
basic difference between telephone conversations and email messages. A
telephone conversation can only be monitored while it is taking place
since there is no permanent record left after the conversation ends. Simi-
larly, an email message can be intercepted in transmission as it travels
from sender to recipient. But the message can also be accessed while it is
stored in the recipient's mailbox. In this respect, an email message
shares some characteristics of a paper letter in that they both constitute a
more permanent record than a phone call.
This article asserts that the same level of protection from covert sur-
veillance should attach to communications by telephone, email, or
conventional mail. Regardless of the medium of communication, surrep-
titious governmental intrusion upon the private exchange of ideas should
be regulated by the same standard because the privacy interest is one and
the same.
Berger'46 did not explain why the Supreme Court assumed that tele-
phone conversations deserved greater protections against police
wiretapping than are afforded to letters in the mail. Maybe the court as-
sumed that the real-time nature of the interception of a telephone call
was somehow more intrusive than covert interception of letters in the
mail. But the intrusive nature of the wiretap does not come from the fact
that it is contemporaneous with the communication. Rather, the highly
intrusive aspect of the telephone wiretap derives from the fact that the
police surreptitiously intercept private communications, implicating a
First Amendment right that was recognized with respect to the mail in
Van Leeuwen.247
If so, then the constitutional protections for wire communications set
out in Berger as codified and expanded by the Federal Wiretap Act
should be equally applicable to the mail and electronic communications
as well. It follows that the same safeguards against covert police surveil-
245. To avoid the more stringent limitations on searches of email messages in transmis-
sion, law enforcement officers may simply seek judicial approval for access to the same
messages in electronic storage once they reach the recipient's inbox. Gregory L. Brown, Steve
Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service: Seizure of Stored Electronic Mail is not
an "Interception" Under the Federal Wiretap Act, 69 TUL. L. REv. 1381, 1390 (1995).
246. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
247. See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251 (1970).
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lance should govern all media of communication that are deemed de-
serving of protection.4 8
As computer technology continues to converge with telecommunica-
tions technology, arbitrary statutory distinctions will lead to illogical
results. For example, Michael Leib points out that if any part of a com-
munication is deemed to be "wire" or "oral," then the entire
communication is deemed to be "wire" or "oral," even if the communica-
tion is predominantly "electronic., 249 Therefore, internet telephony
communications between a person using a computer and another person
using a telephone should be treated as a wire communication. Unless
wire and electronic communications are governed by the same rules, the
courts will be forced to draw the same type of arbitrary distinctions as
when they struggled to determine the privacy rights of people who used
a mobile telephone or cordless telephone to speak to someone using a
wire telephone.
1. Judicial Treatment of Stored Email under Inconsistent Provisions in
the Federal Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act
Arguably the leading decision in the area of police searches of email
is Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service.25 The case
involved the search of email held on a server at a privately owned busi-
ness. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. published books, magazines, and
games. It established an electronic bulletin board on one of its com-
puters, where it posted public information about its products. The
bulletin board also permitted customers to send and receive private
email.2 2 Email addressed to a customer was "temporarily" stored on the
hard drive of the computer running the bulletin board. The recipient
could access his messages via computer and modem from other loca-
tions. The recipient then had the option to either delete the messages or
253to store them on the hard drive of the Steve Jackson Games computer.
The Secret Service suspected a Steve Jackson Games employee of
involvement in the unauthorized duplication and distribution of a file
248. Michael Leib argues that electronic communication receives a lower level of protec-
tion than oral and wire communication as the result of a political compromise that was
necessary to obtain Justice Department approval of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act. Unless the Justice Department endorsed the proposed legislation, it was not likely to be
signed into law during the Reagan Administration. See Leib, supra note 216, at 409-11. Even
so, this does not explain the difference in treatment for email in transmission and email stored
in the recipient's mailbox.
249. Id. at 415-17.
250. See supra Part V.B.2.
251. 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
252. Id. at 458.
253. Id.
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containing proprietary corporate information. Believing that a copy of
the file might be found on the Steve Jackson Games bulletin board, the
Secret Service obtained a search warrant authorizing the seizure of com-
puter hardware and also authorizing its agents to read the information
stored therein.2 4
Subsequently, several people who maintained email accounts
through Steve Jackson Games filed suit against the Secret Service. These
plaintiffs asked for damages as authorized by the Federal Wiretap Act
and the Stored Communications Act.255 The district court found that
Secret Service agents read and deleted private email from the computer
they had seized. The district court went on to award statutory damages
under the Stored Communications Act, but held that the email was not
256
"intercepted" as the word is used in the Federal Wiretap Act. The
plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit in order to recover greater
251statutory damages pursuant to the Federal Wiretap Act.
The Fifth Circuit described the issue before it as "whether the sei-
zure of a computer on which is stored private E-mail that has been sent
to an electronic bulletin board, but not yet read (retrieved) by the recipi-
ents, constitutes an 'intercept' proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(l)(a).2 5
In affirming the district court, the Fifth Circuit held that interception
does not take place where a stored electronic transmission is seized be-
fore it is read by the intended recipient.259 The Fifth Circuit reached this
conclusion by focusing on a key distinction between the definitions of
"wire communication" and "electronic communication" as set out in the
Federal Wiretap Act.
26°
In essence, the court reasoned that the Federal Wiretap Act defined
"intercept" so as to include the "aural or other acquisition of the contents
of ... wire, electronic, or oral communications., 26' The court went on to
note that the definition of wire communication includes any electronic
storage of a wire communication.262 In contrast, the definition of elec-
tronic communication does not likewise include any electronic storage of
an electronic communication. 263 Based on this distinction, the court con-
254. Id. at 458-59.
255. The plaintiffs also alleged violation of the Privacy Protection Act, which is not
relevant to this discussion. See Id. at 459.
256. Id. at 459-60.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 460.
259. Id. at 460-63.
260. Id. at 461-62.
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cluded that Congress did not intend the law governing interception to be
applicable to electronic communications that are in electronic storage.266
The court went on to buttress this conclusion by discussing the
Stored Communications Act, which expressly governs unauthorized ac-
cess to electronic communication in electronic storage. Since the Stored
Communications Act was plainly applicable, the court reasoned that the
Federal Wiretap Act was not controlling.
Steve Jackson Games illustrates some of the problems inherent in the
statutory scheme. The decision makes clear that the greater protection of
the Federal Wiretap Act applies to the interception of email that is in
transmission, while the lesser protection of the Stored Communications
Act is applicable to email in electronic storage. The court articulated
some of the differences in the statutory protections. For example, the
court noted that the Federal Wiretap Act imposes strict time limits during
which the eavesdropping can be conducted, and also requires law en-
forcement officers to minimize any monitoring of communications not
relevant to the investigation. 266 Neither of these matters is addressed by
the Stored Communications Act.
These arbitrary statutory distinctions overlook the basic privacy in-
terest at issue. The intended recipient of an email message has the same
privacy interest regardless of whether law enforcement officials intercept
the message while it is in transmission or whether law enforcement offi-
cials access it after it has already arrived in the recipient's electronic
mailbox. Since the privacy interest is the same, one would expect the
protections of the privacy interest to be the same.
The rejection of this basic principle is reminiscent of the discredited
rationale of Olmstead, which denied Fourth Amendment protection
against wiretaps conducted without a physical trespass into a person's
home or office.267 In Olmstead, the Supreme Court was willing to offer
protection against a trespass, but was unwilling to recognize a privacy
interest in communications traveling over the public telephone lines.268
Conversely, the current statutory scheme sets out greater safeguards
against the interception of an electronic communication traveling over
the public Internet than it sets out against electronic trespass to a per-
son's electronic mailbox for the purpose of reading that same
communication in storage.269 And as will be discussed, the statutory pro-
tections against interception of an electronic communication during
264. Id. at 461-62.
265. Id. at 462-63.
266. Id. at 463.
267. 277 U.S. 438 (1928); see discussion supra Part IV.A.
268. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465-66.
269. See supra note 9.
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transmission are likewise substantially greater than the protections
against law enforcement agents covertly breaking into an office to read
that same communication in storage on the hard drive of a personal
computer."'
In a thoughtful and interesting effort to provide a logical explanation
for these different statutory safeguards, Orin Kerr argues that the law
often distinguishes between the treatment of prospective and retrospec-
tive searches.27' Prospective searches, such as wiretaps, seek evidence
that did not yet exist at the time the warrant was issued. Therefore, pro-
spective searches raise more serious privacy concerns than the traditional
retrospective search for evidence that already exists when the warrant is
sought. Kerr asserts that a prospective search of a computer network is
particularly intrusive because the police cannot know in advance just
what email they will discover coming into or out of the suspect's elec-
tronic mailbox.272 Of course, much of it may be irrelevant to the
investigation. However, Professor Kerr claims that a retrospective search
for stored email is usually less intrusive because many relevant messages
may have been deleted.273
Professor Kerr makes an interesting argument, but the better view is
that a person has the same privacy interest in his email whether it is in-
tercepted during transmission or accessed from storage in his electronic
mailbox. And regardless of whether the search is conducted prospec-
tively or retrospectively, the police are likely to obtain email that is
irrelevant to the investigation. For example, the retrospective search con-
ducted in Steve Jackson Games clearly obtained a great deal of material
that was irrelevant to the investigation. Moreover, the possibility that a
retrospective search for stored email may be unsuccessful because some
messages have been deleted does not lessen the impact of the intrusion
into the privacy of the person under investigation.
Professor Kerr looks to the prospective or retrospective nature of the
search in order to justify the difference in statutory protection. But it
would be better to look at whether the search is conducted surrepti-
tiously without contemporaneous notice to the person being subjected to
the search. If so, law enforcement officers should be held to a higher
standard than would govern their actions when they give contemporane-
ous notice of the search.
Of course, prospective searches of emails in transmission must be
conducted in secret without contemporaneous notice because no suspect
270. See infra Part VII.
271. Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law after the USA PATRIOT Act: the Big
Brother that Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 607, 616-18 (2003).
272. Id.
273. Id.
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would send incriminating emails if he knew that they would be inter-
cepted by the police. But retrospective searches for stored email can be
conducted with or without contemporaneous notice. This article asserts
that retrospective law enforcement access to stored email without notice
to the holder of the mailbox constitutes the same invasion of privacy as
prospective law enforcement interception of a message during transmis-
sion. If so, then both should be afforded the same protections of the
Berger standards as codified in the Federal Wiretap Act. On the other
hand, lesser safeguards are sufficient if law enforcement officers give
contemporaneous notice to the mailbox holder when they conduct a ret-
rospective search for stored email.
The highly technical language of the Federal Wiretap Act and the
Stored Communications Act lead to additional distinctions in the treat-
ment of email without regard to the underlying privacy interests. It is
important to note that Steve Jackson Games addressed the statutory
treatment of email stored in the recipient's electronic mailbox before the
recipient actually read it. The more recent decision in Fraser v. Nation-
wide Mutual Insurance Co.274 had the opportunity to further confuse
matters when it was faced with issues of statutory construction as ap-
plied to email that had already been read by the recipient.
Fraser was an insurance agent with Nationwide, which provided an
email system for use by its agents. Company officials suspected Fraser
of contract violations. An information technology employee searched
through stored email in the accounts of Fraser and other agents to dis-
cover evidence of Fraser's activities. Fraser sent a particular message to
an agent named McAllister that revealed a potential contract violation. A
stored copy of the message was retrieved from McAllister's electronic
mailbox on Nationwide's server even though McAllister previously re-
trieved and deleted his copy of it.
275
Nationwide fired Fraser. His subsequent lawsuit against Nationwide
alleged violations of the Federal Wiretap Act and the Stored Communi-
cations Act. The court reasoned that the Federal Wiretap Act generally
prohibits interception of email during the course of transmission. After
an extended discussion of the way email works, the court concluded that
a message remains in transmission after it has reached the recipient's
mailbox but has not yet been retrieved. Once the message has been re-
trieved, it is no longer subject to the provisions of the Federal Wiretap
Act. Since McAllister had already retrieved the message, the copy that
274. 135 E Supp. 2d 623 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
275. Id. at 627-31.
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nevertheless remained on the server was not governed by the Federal
276Wiretap Act.
The court also reasoned that the Stored Communications Act gener-
ally prohibits unauthorized access to email in electronic storage.277 But
the statutory definition of electronic storage is limited to temporary, in-
termediate storage incidental to transmission as well as storage for
purposes of backup protection. Based on its discussion of how email
works, the court believed that the message found on the server was not in
intermediate storage. 27" Nor did it qualify as a backup, which the court
viewed as a copy that an email system stores only while a message is in
transmission as protection in case the system crashes before transmission
is completed. Therefore, it was not subject to the protection of the Stored
Communications Act.279
By focusing on the technology rather than on the underlying policy,
the court reached a poor result. Further application of the court's analysis
would unavoidably lead to some unintended consequences. For example,
consider that 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)280 generally prohibits the interception
of electronic communication such as email. And 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) 8'
generally prohibits unauthorized access to electronic communication
held in electronic storage. Under the logic of Fraser, a "hacker" who
electronically breaks into an Internet Service Provider's network and
reads email that has already been viewed by the intended recipient has
violated neither statute.
Similarly, consider that 18 U.S.C. § 2518282 sets out the procedure
for law enforcement officers to request authorization to intercept elec-
tronic communications. Also consider that 18 U.S.C. § 2703 28 sets out
the procedure for law enforcement officers to request authorization to
gain access to stored electronic communications. Under the logic of
Fraser, neither statute gives law enforcement officers the power to re-
quest judicial authorization to read email that has already been viewed
by the recipient. Yet if law enforcement officers hacked into the network
and obtained the message without prior judicial approval, neither statute
would have been violated.
The Justice Department takes a somewhat more nuanced approach.
The Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the Criminal
276. Id. at 631-35.
277. Id. at 635-36.
278. Id. at 637.
279. Id.
280. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2000).
281. Id. § 2701(a).
282. Id. § 2518.
283. Id. § 2703.
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Division provides comprehensive advice to U.S. Attorneys on interpret-
ing the Federal Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act.2 4 The
Justice Department focuses on the statutory definition of "electronic
storage" as limited in scope to "temporary, intermediate storage of a[n]
... electronic communication incidental to electronic transmission
thereof; and . . . any storage of such communication by an electronic
communication service for purposes of backup protection.,2" The Justice
Department also focuses on the statutory distinction between an "elec-
tronic communication service" and a "remote computing service. 286
For all practical purposes, an Internet Service Provider, which offers
Internet access and email accounts to its subscribers, qualifies as a pro-
vider of electronic communication service. An example of a provider of
remote computing service is the iDisk service offered by Apple Com-
puter, which allows subscribers to store files online so they can be
accessed by the subscriber from multiple locations. 287 A person might use
a remote computing service to facilitate access to his files while travel-
ing or to store files for backup protection.
The Justice Department uses an illustration to make sense of a very
288complicated analysis. A similar illustration will demonstrate the Justice
Department's analysis for purposes of this article. This illustration will
consider email held in an account with America Online, an ISP available
to the general public. This will be compared to email held in an account
at the University of Idaho, which provides Internet access only to faculty,
staff, and students, but not to the general public.
If a person leaves unopened email in his mailbox at America Online
or at the University of Idaho for 180 days or less, then 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(a) requires law enforcement officers to obtain a search warrant in
accordance with the federal rules of criminal procedure in order to gain
access to those messages. 28 9 The Justice Department argues that accord-
ing to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A), law enforcement officers who obtain a
search warrant based on probable cause pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. Pro.
41 need not provide contemporaneous notice to the mailbox holder.29°
In contrast, the Justice Department argument leads to the result that
unopened email in a person's mailbox at America Online or at the
University of Idaho for more than 180 days is subject to lesser
284. See SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS, supra note 240.
285. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2000).
286. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2000) with 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2000).
287. See http://www.mac.com. (advertising "[t]ransfer files too large to email, exchange
documents... or just store files online.") (last visited October 17, 2003)
288. See SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS, supra note 240, § I B.
289. Id. at §§ III D, III F.
290. Id.
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protections under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B), permitting law
enforcement access pursuant to search warrant without notice to the
mailbox holder, or upon issuance of a subpoena or court order as
alternatives to a search warrant.9
Of course, access pursuant to subpoena or court order would nor-
mally require contemporaneous notice to the owner of the email account.
However, the statute also provides for access without contemporaneous
291. Id. at § III F The Justice Department is mistaken in asserting that law enforcement
officers need only serve a search warrant on the ISP in compliance with FED. R. CRIM. PRo. 41
and need not provide notice to the mailbox holder. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), governing access to
unopened email stored for 180 days or less, requires law enforcement officers to obtain "a
warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."
There is no mention of access without notice to the mailbox holder. A more reasonable inter-
pretation of the statute would require law enforcement officers to give contemporaneous
notice to the mailbox holder. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) goes on to mandate that law enforcement
officers can obtain access to unopened email stored for more than 180 days by any means
authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b). 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(l)(A) authorizes law enforcement
officers to gain access to unopened email stored for more than 180 days "without required
notice to the subscriber or customer" if they obtain "a warrant issued using the procedures
described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."
Significantly, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) implies that contemporaneous notice to the mailbox
holder is normally "required." Since 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) makes no provision to delay the
required notice to the mailbox holder when obtaining access to email stored for 180 days or
less, it is logical to believe that contemporaneous notice is required.
It is important to consider that 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) requires law enforcement officers to
obtain a warrant in accordance with the totality of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in
order to gain access to email stored more than 180 days without required notice to the mailbox
holder. The Justice Department interprets this provision as merely requiring compliance with
FED. R. CRIM. PRo. 41, concerning search and seizure in general. But a better interpretation
would also require compliance with the additional procedural safeguards of 18 U.S.C. § 3103a
concerning searches with delayed notice. This interpretation would be more in keeping with
Dempsey's observation that as technology progresses, many of our most important records
will not be "papers" stored in our houses, but will be electronic files accessed from remote
locations. See Dempsey, supra note 9.
But even if law enforcement officers must comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3103a in conducting
a search of email stored for more that 180 days without contemporaneous notice to the mail-
box holder, the statutory safeguards are not as rigorous as those of 18 U.S.C. § 2518
concerning interception of communications during transmission. Thus, law enforcement offi-
cers can obtain a warrant for a surreptitious search of stored email without showing that
alternative investigative techniques have been tried or would be unlikely to succeed or would
be too dangerous. And there is no express requirement that law enforcement officers executing
the search minimize their access to email not relevant to the investigation. Both of these safe-
guards would be applicable to law enforcement efforts to intercept email messages during
transmission.
Once again, all of these technical distinctions resulting from efforts to interpret the statu-
tory scheme serve no purpose if one accepts the assumption that the underlying privacy
interest remains the same regardless of whether the message is intercepted during transmis-
sion, regardless of whether the message has been opened by the recipient, and regardless of
whether the message has been stored for more than 180 days.
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notice.292 Thus, law enforcement officers can obtain surreptitious access
even in the absence of a search warrant based on probable cause.
This disparity in protection against law enforcement searches makes
little sense. If translated to physical searches of paper documents, an un-
opened letter stored in a file cabinet for 180 days or less in a person's
office would be afforded greater protection from search and seizure than
another unopened letter in the same drawer that was stored for more than
180 days.
The Justice Department's argument also leads to the result that if a
person opens his email but leaves it in his mailbox at America Online,
law enforcement officers can again obtain access through a subpoena or
court order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) as an alternative to a search
warrant. The Justice Department reasons that the mailbox holder is using
America Online not as his Internet Service Provider with respect to that
opened email, but as a remote computing service in order to store his
opened email. Since America Online is acting as a remote computing
service and the opened email is no longer in "temporary, intermediate
storage," it is no longer entitled to the search warrant requirement of 18
U.S.C. § 2703(a).293
But if a person opens his email and leaves it in his mailbox at the
University of Idaho, the Justice Department would conclude that the
Stored Communications Act no longer applies. Again, the Justice De-
partment reasons that the mailbox holder is using the University of Idaho
not as his Internet Service Provider with respect to that opened email,
but as a remote computing service. However, the applicable statutory
provisions only provide protection for files stored at a remote computing
service that is available to the general public. Because the University of
Idaho does not issue Internet accounts to the general public, law en-
294forcement access to opened email is not regulated by statute.
If the Justice Department interpretation is correct, then it follows
that the Stored Communications Act does not prohibit a "hacker" or a
law enforcement officer from accessing opened email in storage on a
server by an Internet Service Provider that does not accept subscriptions
from the general public. From here it could be argued that law enforce-
ment officers do not need judicial authorization to access opened email
in electronic storage at an ISP not available to the general public because
the statute does not create any privacy interest. But the Justice Depart-
ment does not take such an extreme position. Rather, the Justice
Department argues that a subpoena is required before law enforcement
292. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(b)(1)(B), 2705 (2000).
293. SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS, supra note 240, §§ III B, II F.
294. Id.
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officers can obtain access to opened email at an ISP that is not available
to the general public.2 95
While Steve Jackson Games, Fraser, and the Computer Crime Sec-
tion's Searching and Seizing Computers concentrate on statutory
interpretation, the military case of United States v. Maxwell296 focuses on
constitutional issues raised by the search of a person's email account.
Maxwell may be the first case to recognize a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a person's email account.
Air Force Colonel James Maxwell subscribed to America Online
("AOL") for email and other online services. AOL allowed its subscrib-
ers the opportunity to open up to five separate email accounts per
subscription. Each account had its own unique user i.d., referred to as a
"screen name" in AOL terminology, and its own password. Each email
account made use of its own "mailbox. 297
In 1991, a subscriber named Roger Dietz complained that child por-
nography was being distributed on AOL. Dietz claimed that he received
email messages with pornographic images attached to them. AOL repre-
298
sentatives contacted the FBI.
Dietz was not the original recipient of the messages that he found
objectionable. The headers indicated that the messages had been sent to
others and forwarded on before they reached Dietz. By reading the head-
ers, the messages could be traced from the originator through the
recipients prior to Dietz. But the headers only revealed their screen
299
names rather than their true identities.
The FBI obtained a search warrant directing AOL to provide copies
of all the email in the mailboxes corresponding to about 80 screen names
taken from the headers of the messages. AOL was also ordered to iden-
tify the holders of the screen names.300
Because representatives of AOL and the FBI held preliminary dis-
cussions before the warrant was issued, AOL had a general idea of the
information that would be demanded by the warrant before it was actu-
ally issued. Accordingly, AOL wrote a program to extract the necessary
information from its computers. There was some question as to whether
AOL ran the program before the warrant was served. Regardless, AOL's
program provided the FBI with more information than was called for by
the search warrant. Not only did AOL identify the subscribers and turn
over all of the email in the mailboxes of the eighty listed screen names,
295. Id.
296. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F 1996).
297. Id. at411-12.
298. Id. at 412.
299. Id. at 412-13.
300. Id.
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AOL also turned over email from all additional mailboxes belonging to
those subscribers under their other screen names."'
Using the information from AOL, the FBI discovered that the screen
name "Reddel," which was listed in the search warrant, belonged to
Colonel Maxwell. The FBI also discovered that Colonel Maxwell had
another mailbox under the screen name of "Zirloc." In the Zirloc mail-
box, the FBI found messages that were sent to another Air Force officer
discussing Colonel Maxwell's sexual preferences.3 2
The FBI contacted the Air Force Office of Special Investigations,
which started its own investigation of Colonel Maxwell. Based on the
original search warrant and the Zirloc email, the AFOSI obtained au-
thorization from a military magistrate to search Colonel Maxwell's home
for evidence related to "possession and transmission of child pornogra-
phy and other obscene matter."3 3 AFOSI agents seized Colonel
Maxwell's computer and located three images involving child pornogra-
phy.
At general court-martial, Colonel Maxwell was convicted of of-
fenses connected with the images found on his computer and two
additional offenses related to the Zirloc email. 3°4 The trial court decision
was affirmed by the U.S. Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals.30 5 But the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces reversed the part of the con-
viction related to the Zirlock mailbox, holding that a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his email account.3°
The court explained that a party to a telephone conversation has a
reasonable expectation that the police will not monitor his conversation
in the absence of prior judicial authorization.30 7 And a person who mails
a letter has a reasonable expectation that the police will not read it unless
they first obtain a search warrant.308 Nevertheless, a party to a telephone
conversation runs the risk that the other party will reveal the substance of
the conversation to the police or to others.39 And a person who mails a
letter runs the risk that the recipient will show it to someone else.3"°
Having made this analogy, the court went on to the logical conclu-
sion:
301. Id. at 413.
302. Id. at 413-14.
303. Id. at 414.
304. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406,410 (C.A.A.E 1996).
305. United States v. Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995) (NO. ACM
30704).
306. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 410-14, 423-24 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
307. Id. at 417.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 417-19.
310. Id. at 418.
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Drawing from these parallels, we can say that the transmitter of
an e-mail message enjoys a reasonable expectation that police
officials will not intercept the transmission without probable
cause and a search warrant. However, once the transmissions are
received by another person, the transmitter no longer controls its
destiny. In a sense, e-mail is like a letter. It is sent and lies sealed
in the computer until the recipient opens his or her computer and
retrieves the transmission. The sender enjoys a reasonable ex-
pectation that the initial transmission will not be intercepted by
the police. The fact that an unauthorized "hacker" might inter-
cept an e-mail message does not diminish the legitimate
expectation of privacy in any way."'
Therefore, Colonel Maxwell did not have a privacy interest in the
messages that Dietz turned over to the FBI and so was not entitled to
Fourth Amendment protection.32 However, Colonel Maxwell had a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the contents of each of his separate
email accounts as stored on AOL's computers.3 3 The search warrant au-
thorized a search of the mailboxes corresponding to the 80 particular
screen names taken from the FBI affidavit, but did not authorize a search
of any other mailboxes used by the AOL subscribers under investigation.
In the absence of authorization to seize email from the Zirloc mailbox,
the Zirloc messages must be suppressed.34
Maxwell also raises other issues that the court did not discuss. The
search warrant directed AOL to turn over to the FBI all email in the 80
listed mailboxes."5 However, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
analogized email to a telephone conversation in finding a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy. Significantly, Berger held, inter alia, that Fourth
Amendment principles demand that judicial authorization to conduct a
telephone wiretap must describe with particularity the conversations to
be intercepted.3 6 Based on this description, law enforcement officers
must minimize their eavesdropping on irrelevant conversations.3 7
Likewise, the Maxwell search warrant should have imposed similar
restrictions on email that is either intercepted in transmission or taken
from electronic storage in the recipient's mailbox. Yet the warrant placed
311. Id.
312. Id. at 417-19.
313. Id. at 420.
314. Id. at 419-22.
315. Id. at 433.
316. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55-56 (1967).
317. See, Michael Goldsmith and Kathryn Ogden Balmforth, The Electronic Surveil-
lance of Privileged Communications: A Conflict in Doctrines, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 924-35
(1991) (discussing minimization in the context of telephone wiretaps).
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no limits on the email in Colonel Maxwell's mailbox that the FBI could
read. Rather, it subjected all email in Colonel Maxwell's "Reddel"
mailbox to review by the FBI. At the least, the authorization should have
specified with particularity that the FBI was to focus on email that con-
tained pornographic images while minimizing its intrusion into other
318
messages.
The Berger safeguards of particularity and minimization are codified
by the Federal Wiretap Act at 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(c) and § 2518(5). 319
The Federal Wiretap Act applies these safeguards to the interception of
telephone calls and also to the interception of electronic communication
such as email. But the Stored Communications Act contains no corre-
sponding protection governing law enforcement access to stored email.
This statutory distinction is unjustified. Steve Jackson Games tried to
rationalize it by asserting that law enforcement officers are less likely to
examine the entirety of all stored email messages in a person's mailbox
because they can use technology to key word search through it and only
read the relevant messages. 20 But the court believed that it is not possible
to key word search through email as it is intercepted during transmis-
sion.321 This position is not entirely accurate.
Intercepted email is normally stored on disk by law enforcement of-
ficers322 and could be key word searched before they read any of it. In
any event, law enforcement officers are not obligated to consistently im-
plement any key word or other minimization strategy for stored email
unless required to do so by statute or case law.
Maxwell correctly recognized a Fourth Amendment privacy interest
in a person's email account. Surprisingly, Maxwell focused on the consti-
tutional issue with no discussion of Berger. Nor did Maxwell discuss the
Federal Wiretap Act or the Stored Communications Act. Having analo-
gized email to a telephone conversation, the court should have addressed
the need to apply the Berger safeguards to the email stored in Colonel
Maxwell's "Redde 1" account as a matter of constitutional law.323
318. Despite the broad language of the warrant, there is some indication that AOL only
produced email that had attached graphics files. 45 M.J. at 413. But if so, then the FBI would
not have discovered the Zirloc email containing a discussion of sexual preferences with no
"questionable graphics files." Id. at 414.
319. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(4)(c), 2518(5) (2000).
320. Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d 457, 463. (5th Cir. 1994).
321. Id.
322. See infra Part VI.
323. Despite these criticisms, Maxwell's recognition of Fourth Amendment principles is
sound and represents the better view. In contrast, Professor Kerr argues that courts are gener-
ally reluctant to extend Fourth Amendment protections to new communications technologies
that are already safeguarded by statute. See supra Kerr, supra note 273, at 629-30.
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2. Judicial Treatment of Voicemail under Inconsistent Provisions in the
Federal Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act
The Ninth Circuit was squarely faced with inconsistencies in the
provisions of the Federal Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications
Act in United States v. Smith.324 There, a corporate officer named Smith
telephoned an employee named Bravo. Smith left a voicemail message
revealing that he was engaged in illegal insider trading of PDA Engi-
neering Corp. stock. It turns out that Bravo did not select a very secure
password to protect her email account. Another employee, Gore, guessed
Bravo's password and secretly accessed her mailbox for unknown rea-
sons. Gore forwarded Smith's message to her own mailbox. Gore then
tape recorded Smith's message and gave the recording to an employee
named Phillips. He telephoned the U.S. Attorney's office and played it
for an Assistant U.S. Attorney, who began a criminal investigation. Sub-
sequently, Smith was convicted in federal district court. The court
suppressed evidence of the stored voicemail message, but permitted the
Government to present the rest of its evidence. The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the conviction .
Smith argued on appeal that the Federal Wiretap Act provided the
controlling law. He claimed that the voicemail message had been ille-
gally intercepted. Accordingly, the message and all evidence derived
therefrom must be suppressed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2515. The Ninth
Circuit summarized Smith's argument as follows:
Smith insists that the Wiretap Act controls. The district court
agreed. Section 2515 provides, in relevant part, that "[w]henever
any wire.., communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communication and no evidence derived there-
from may be received in evidence in any trial." 18 U.S.C. § 2515
(emphasis added). Section 2510(1) defines "wire communica-
tion" as "any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the
use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the
aid of wire, cable or other like connection" and expressly in-
cludes within its scope "any electronic storage of such
communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (emphasis added) [foot-
note omitted]. Section 2510(4) defines "intercept" as "the aural
or other acquisition of the contents of any wire ... communica-
tion through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other
device." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).
324. 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998).
325. Id. at 1053-54, 1070.
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In view of the rather broad definitions supplied in § 2510, Smith
argues, the voicemail message Gore retrieved from Bravo's
mailbox seems rather plainly to fit within the language of the
exclusionary provision of § 2515. For starters, the message it-
self, which Smith left in the voicemail system via telephone, was
a "wire communication;" it was an "aural transfer," made using
a wire facility (the telephone line), and was subsequently "elec-
tronic[ally] stor[ed]" within the voicemail system. In addition,
Gore's act of recording the message with a handheld audiotape-
recording "device" constituted an "aural or other acquisition"
[footnote omitted] -and, hence, an "interception"-of the mes-
sage. It is clear, Smith insists, that [section] 2515 applies.326
Smith's argument accurately stated the law according to the Federal
Wiretap Act as it existed at the time. However, the Government answered
with an equally accurate statement of the law pursuant to the Stored
Communications Act:
Section 2701, which is part of the Stored Communications Act,
provides for the criminal punishment of anyone who "intention-
ally accesses without authorization a facility through which an
electronic communication service is provided ... and thereby
obtains ... access to a wire ... communication while it is in
storage in such system." 18 U.S.C. § 2701. There is no doubt
that the voicemail message at issue is a "wire communication."
[footnote omitted] We have also already observed that the mes-
sage was in "storage" within PDA's voicemail system. When
Gore used Bravo's password to dial into the voicemail system,
and then retrieved and recorded Smith's message, the govern-
ment argues, she violated § 2701's prohibition on "access[ing]"
stored wire communications. Consequently, the government ar-
gues, the voicemail message fits within § 2701.
The fact that § 2701, as well as § 2515, appears to apply to the
voicemail message is significant, the government argues, be-
cause, unlike the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act
does not provide an exclusion remedy. It allows for civil dam-
ages, see 18 U.S.C. § 2707, and criminal punishment, see 18
U.S.C. § 2701(b), but nothing more. Indeed, the Stored Commu-
nications Act expressly rules out exclusion as a remedy; § 2708,
entitled "Exclusivity of Remedies," states specifically that
§ 2707's civil cause of action and § 2701(b)'s criminal penalties
326. Id. at 1055.
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"are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for violations of" the
Stored Communications Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2708 (emphasis added).
Therein lies the rub. If the voicemail message at issue is subject to
the strictures of the Stored Communications Act, then suppression
is not an available remedy. If, however, it is subject to the Wiretap
Act, then suppression is quite explicitly available. In other words,
with respect to this case, the Wiretap Act and the Stored Commu-
nications Act appear, on their faces, to be mutually exclusive
statutes (with mutually exclusive remedial schemes). Unfortu-
nately, at least at first glance, Congress seems to have defied the
laws of semantics and managed to make the voicemail message
here at issue simultaneously subject to both. [footnote omitted]3 27
In an attempt to reconcile the discrepancy, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the Stored Communications Act is a lesser included offense within the
Federal Wiretap Act.3 28 The court reasoned that a person can obtain access
to a communications facility without actually discovering the contents of
the communications stored therein. A person who simply obtains access
to the facility has violated the Stored Communications Act. But when that
person goes further and actually learns the contents of stored communica-
tions, he has violated the Federal Wiretap Act.
The court reached this conclusion by concentrating on the words "in-
tercept" in the Federal Wiretap Act and "access" in the Stored
Communications Act. The court explained:
The word "intercept" entails actually acquiring the contents of a
communication, whereas the word "access" merely involves being
in position to acquire the contents of a communication. In other
words, "access[]" is, for all intents and purposes, a lesser included
offense (or tort, as the case may be) of "intercept[ion]." As applied
to the facts of this case, Gore might have violated the Stored
Communications Act's prohibition on "access[ing]" by simply
making unauthorized use of Bravo's voicemail password and
roaming about PDA's automated voicemail system, even had she
never recorded or otherwise "intercepted" the contents of any
given message. Once she retrieved and recorded Smith's message,
however, she crossed the line between the Stored Communica-
tions Act and the Wiretap Act and violated the latter's prohibition
on "intercept[ion]. 330
327. Id. at 1055-56 (emphasis in original).
328. Id. at 1058.
329. Id. at 1059.
330. Id. at 1058 (emphasis in original).
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The court ultimately concluded that Gore had intercepted Smith's
voicemail message in violation of the Federal Wiretap Act."' The evi-
dence of the voicemail message was properly suppressed by the district
court, while evidence derived from the voicemail was sufficiently at-
tenuated as to be properly admissible as evidence.332 This derivative
evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Stored Communications Act
is in error. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section who-
ever-
(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through
which an electronic communication service is provided; or
(2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility;
and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a
wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic
storage in such system shall be punished as provided in sub-
section (b) of this section.333
According to the Ninth Circuit, a person commits an offense under
the Stored Communications Act by intentionally gaining unauthorized
access to an electronic communications service so as to be in a position
to obtain access or alter access or prevent authorized access to a stored
communication without actually reading the communication.334
The court's reading of the statute makes much of its language un-
necessary. A person who obtains access to a communication that was not
addressed to him or who prevents the intended recipient from obtaining
access has altered access to that communication. Accordingly, the prohi-
bition against placing oneself in a position to alter access would be
sufficient to state the elements of the offense. The two other prohibitions
would be redundant.
A better interpretation of the Stored Communications Act would say
that a person commits a violation when he intentionally gains unauthor-
ized access to an electronic communications service and actually obtains
or alters a stored communication, or prevents authorized access to it.
Such an interpretation is more consistent with the rest of the statute.
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation leads to unintended consequences
for the statutory treatment of email because the Stored Communications
Act treats email the same as voicemail. Specifically, the court's analysis
331. Id. at 1058.
332. Id. at 1059-63.
333. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000).
334. See 155 E3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 1998).
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leads to the conclusion that whenever someone gains unauthorized ac-
cess to an electronic communication service provider and reads someone
else's stored email, he has violated the Federal Wiretap Act as though the
email has been intercepted during transmission.
It follows that Smith places a higher burden on law enforcement offi-
cers than is contemplated by the statutory scheme. Under the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning, it would make no sense for the FBI to seek a warrant
pursuant to the Stored Communications Act at 18 U.S.C. § 2703 because
the Stored Communications Act only governs efforts to put oneself into
position to surreptitiously read an email message. Assuming that the po-
lice want to read that message, they would have to comply with the more
stringent provisions of the Federal Wiretap Act at 18 U.S.C. § 2518 gov-
erning interception of email.
Put another way, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation leads to the con-
clusion that all eavesdropping on wire or electronic communication is
governed by the Federal Wiretap Act. If so, then law enforcement offi-
cers must comply with the strict standards of 18 U.S.C. § 2518 in
seeking authorization to read a suspect's email regardless of whether that
email is intercepted while in transmission or whether it is accessed from
electronic storage in the recipient's mailbox at an Internet Service Pro-
vider. Therefore, the lesser warrant standards of 18 U.S.C. § 2703
become completely irrelevant to the statutory scheme despite its plain
language setting out the procedure for obtaining judicial approval to read
a suspect's stored email.
3. Judicial Treatment of Web Sites under Inconsistent Provisions
in the Federal Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act
The Ninth Circuit continued to struggle with the implications of
Smith when it decided Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines.35 There, airline pilot
Robert Konop created a web site critical of his employer and his union.
Site visitors were required to log in with a user name and password. Ko-
nop assigned user names to certain employees, but not to representatives
of management or his union. In order to obtain a password and view the
web site, employees had to register and agree not to disclose the site's
contents. Hawaiian Airlines Vice President James Davis viewed the web
site by logging in with the names of two employees, who gave him per-
mission to use their identities. Konop sued in federal district court. He
alleged that when Davis viewed his secure web site under false pre-
tenses, Davis intercepted an electronic communication in violation of the
335. 236 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Konop 1], opinion withdrawn by 262 F.3d
972 (2001), superseded by 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Konop I], cert. denied
537 U.S. 1193 (2003).
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Federal Wiretap Act and unlawfully accessed stored communications in
an electronic communications facility in violation of the Stored Com-
munications Act. The district court granted summary judgment against
Konop on these claims.336
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit initially held that Konop raised triable
issues of fact as to whether Hawaiian Airlines violated the Federal Wire-
tap Act and the Stored Communications Act.337 However, the opinion was
subsequently withdrawn. In a new opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that
Hawaiian Airlines did not violate the Federal Wiretap Act and affirmed
the summary judgment against Konop with respect to that claim. Consis-
tent with its earlier opinion, the Ninth Circuit again held that Konop
could proceed with his claim under the Stored Communications Act.338
The Ninth Circuit's change of heart illustrates the difficulties caused by
the poorly drafted statutes. The original decision, Konop I, as well as the
revised decision, Konop H will be discussed in detail.
In Konop I, the Ninth Circuit realized that the civil damages recover-
able under the Federal Wiretap Act were substantially greater than the
damages that might be awarded under the Stored Communications Act.339
Accordingly, the court defined the issue before it as whether viewing a
web site through false pretenses constitutes a violation of either or both
statutes.
The court considered the web site to be an electronic communication
held in storage, and focused on the question of whether an electronic
communication (here, a web page) could be intercepted for purposes of
the Federal Wiretap Act while it was held in electronic storage on a web
server. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Steve Jackson Games, which held that an interception must take place
contemporaneously with the transmission of an electronic communica-
tion. 4'
The Ninth Circuit explained:
An electronic communication in storage is no more or less pri-
vate than an electronic communication in transmission.
Distinguishing between the two for purposes of protection from
interception is "irrational" and "an insupportable result given
Congress' emphasis of individual privacy rights during passage
of the ECPA." [citation omitted]
336. Konop 1, 236 F.3d at 1040-42.
337. Id. at 1040.
338. Konop H1, 302 E3d at 872.
339. Konop 1, 236 F.3d at 1042.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 1044-46.
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We believe that Congress intended the ECPA to eliminate dis-
tinctions between protection of private communications based
on arbitrary features of the technology used for transmission.
Reflecting on technological developments of the 1980s with
which the old Wiretap Act had failed to keep pace, the Senate
Report on the ECPA lamented:
Today, we have large-scale electronic mail operations, com-
puter-to-computer data transmissions, cellular and cordless
telephones, paging devices, and video teleconferencing. A
phone call may be carried by wire, by microwave or fiber op-
tics. It can be transmitted in the form of digitized voice, data
or video. Since the divestiture of AT & T and deregulation,
many different companies, not just common carriers, offer a
wide variety of telephone and other communications services.
It does not make sense that a phone call transmitted via com-
mon carrier is protected by the current federal wiretap statute,
while the same phone call transmitted via a private telephone
network such as those used by many major U.S. corporations
today, would not be covered by the statute.
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3556-57. It makes no more sense that a
private message expressed in a digitized voice recording stored
in a voice mailbox should be protected from interception, but the
same words expressed in an e-mail stored in an electronic post
office pending delivery should not.
342
The court concluded by stating that Konop had raised material ques-
tions of fact concerning his claims of interception under the Federal
Wiretap Act as well as his claims of unlawful access under the Stored
Communications Act.343 Very little of the court's opinion addressed the
Stored Communications Act. But the court describes the Stored Com-
munications Act as a lesser included offense of the Federal Wiretap
Act.344
By affirming the reasoning of Smith, the court effectively held that
someone who learns the contents of an electronic communication while
it is in transmission or while it is held in electronic storage has inter-
cepted that communication in violation of the Federal Wiretap Act. In
342. Id. at 1046.
343. Id. at 1048.
344. Id.
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contrast, someone who unlawfully accesses a stored communications
facility but does not proceed so far as to learn the contents of a stored
electronic communication has merely violated the Stored Communica-
tions Act.
The court was absolutely correct in stating that an electronic com-
munication in storage should be afforded the same level of privacy as an
electronic communication in transmission. However, much of the statu-
tory language is inconsistent with this assertion.
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Konop I reinforces Smith's implica-
tion that law enforcement officials would be bound exclusively by the
more rigorous Federal Wiretap Act protections in seeking authorization
to surreptitiously read a suspect's email. The Justice Department was
aware that this result followed from Smith and Konop I. The Justice De-
partment's Computer Crime Section stated that "[t]he decision in Konop
is plainly incorrect: government access to electronic communications in
'electronic storage' is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 2703, not 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518."345
In Konop H, the Ninth Circuit reversed course, holding that violation
of the Federal Wiretap Act occurs only where an electronic communica-1 46
tion is intercepted while in transmission. Thus, Konop II brings the
Ninth Circuit in line with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Steve Jackson
Games.
Konop II tried to distinguish the Ninth Circuit's earlier decision in
Smith, explaining that Smith held that wire communications could be
intercepted subsequent to transmission in violation of the Federal Wire-
tap Act, but did not go so far as to reach the same conclusion for
electronic communication.347 Konop II went on to correctly explain that
Smith was effectively overridden by subsequent legislation. Section 209
of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 amended 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) and 18
U.S.C. § 2703 to remove stored wire communication from the provisions
of the Federal Wiretap Act and place it squarely within the Stored Com-
munications Act.48
Moreover, Konop II recognized the Justice Department's criticism of
Konop I. Konop II held that law enforcement efforts to view wire or
electronic communications in storage at a provider of electronic commu-
nications service need only comply with 18 U.S.C. § 2703, explaining:
345. COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION, CRIM. Div., U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, § IV. C. 2 (January 2001).
346. Konop H, 302 F3d at 878.
347. Id. at 877-78.
348. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2150(1), 2703 (Supp. 2003). These statutory amendments will sun-
set and revert back to prior law on December 31, 2005.
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Thus, if Konop's position were correct and acquisition of a
stored electronic communication were an interception under
the Wiretap Act, the government would have to comply with
the more burdensome, more restrictive procedures of the Wire-
tap Act to do exactly what Congress apparently authorized it to
do under the less burdensome procedures of the [Stored Com-
munications Act]. Congress could not have intended this
result. 349
Although Konop H reached the proper result according to the stat-
utes, it unduly strained to avoid criticizing the rationale of Smith.
Konop II asserted that Smith, like Steve Jackson Games, held that elec-
tronic communications in electronic storage could not be intercepted
and so were governed exclusively by the provisions of the Stored
Communications Act. 3 ' But despite some brief discussion to this ef-
fect,35' crucial passages of Smith were devoted to explaining that
violation of the Stored Communications Act is a lesser included of-
352fense of the Federal Wiretap Act. Smith is reasonably interpreted as
implying that it is a lesser included offense with regard to electronic
communication as well as wire communication. If so, then stored elec-
tronic communications could be intercepted in violation of the Federal
Wiretap Act. This was precisely the way that Konop I interpreted
Smith.
The Smith and Konop I interpretation of the statutes as applied to
stored electronic communication was not affected by the USA
PATRIOT Act amendments,353 which merely made clear that Federal
Wiretap Act protections are not applicable to stored wire communica-
tions such as voicemail. To the extent that the Ninth Circuit approves
the reasoning of Smith, Konop I follows more logically than Konop H.
But even though the Ninth Circuit was unwilling to expressly disavow
the rationale of Smith, Konop II has effectively done so.
In his partial dissent to Konop II, Judge Reinhardt contends that a
stored electronic communication can be intercepted in violation of the
Federal Wiretap Act.5 He finds no justification for defining "intercept"
so as to limit it to the contemporaneous acquisition of electronic com-
munications.
By way of introduction, he raises an interesting question:
349. Konop 11, 302 F. 3d at 879.
350. Id. at 878.
351. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1057 (1998).
352. Id. at 1058-59.
353. See USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 209, 115 Stat. 272, 283 (2001).
354. Konop 11, 302 F.3d at 886-87 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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Because I recognize that any reading of the relevant statutory
provisions raises some difficulties and introduces some incon-
sistencies, the question becomes: which reading is more
coherent and more consistent with Congressional intent?355
If the issue is presented as a question of statutory construction,
then the majority opinion is more consistent with legislative intent be-
cause it avoids the scenario where law enforcement officials are
required to comply with the Federal Wiretap Act to learn the contents
of stored email, while the Stored Communications Act becomes irrele-
vant. But the courts have yet to answer the question of whether the
constitutional protections of Berger v. New York3 5 6 apply to stored
email. If so, the Stored Communications Act limitations on covert po-
lice searches are insufficient to satisfy the constitutional safeguards
that were expressed in Berger.
VI. INTERCEPTION OF EMAIL AND
THE "CARNIVORE" CONTROVERSY
The July 11, 2000 issue of the Wall Street Journal revealed the ex-
istence of software developed at an FBI laboratory in Quantico,
Virginia for the purpose of monitoring communications over the Inter-
net.357 Known as "Carnivore" for its ability to get to the meat of a vast
quantity of information, the software was designed to run on hardware
that is hooked directly into an Internet Service Provider's network.358
The Carnivore software is installed on a personal computer, which
in many cases is kept in a locked cage on the premises of the Internet
Service Provider. Theoretically, Carnivore gives the FBI the ability to
monitor all of the ISP's customers' email and web surfing, although it
is intended to focus on the activities of a specified individual from
among all of the messages passing through the ISP's network.359
The Wall Street Journal article reported that Robert Corn-Revere,
an attorney with Hogan and Hartson, represented an unidentified ISP in
a challenge to the installation of Carnivore. The ISP objected to giving
law enforcement agents access to all email traffic on its system, but a
355. Id. at 887.
356. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
357. Neil King Jr. & Ted Bridis, FBI's Wiretaps to Scan Email Spark Concern, WALL ST.
J., July 11, 2000, at A3.
358. Id.
359. Id.
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magistrate ruled in favor of the government and ordered the installation
of Carnivore.
Mr. Corn-Revere submitted prepared testimony before a subcom-
mittee of the House Judiciary Committee on April 6, 2000. Providing
more information than appeared in the Wall Street Journal, he ex-
plained that he represented an Internet Service Provider in an attempt
to quash an order authorizing U.S. Marshals to install the equivalent of
a pen register and trap and trace device on its network.36" ' The order
called for the Marshals to obtain date, time, and addressing information
regarding email sent to or from a particular email account.362
Initially, a U.S. Marshal told a representative of the ISP that the
Marshals would install commercially available networking software
known as "EtherPeek" on the ISP's network. The ISP was concerned
about the capability of the software to actually view the contents of all
email messages that were sent or received over its system.
3 63
The ISP suggested a compromise whereby the ISP designed a soft-
ware solution that would give the Marshals the necessary information
without installing the EtherPeek software. The Marshal's Service ini-
tially agreed, but became dissatisfied with the compromise and insisted
on installation of its own software. The ISP then filed a motion asking
the Magistrate to quash or modify his order.36
In its opposition to the motion, the government explained that it no
longer intended to install EtherPeek. Rather, it planned to install
proprietary software called "Carnivore." The government acknowledged
that Carnivore was capable of recording more information than was
called for by the magistrate's order, but would be programmed not to do
so. The government also conceded that Carnivore would enable remote
access to the ISP's network and would be under the exclusive control of
its agents. The magistrate denied the ISP's motion, holding that the
Marshal's actions amounted to the functional equivalent of a telephone
pen register and trap and trace device.365
After the Wall Street Journal article was printed, Carnivore was the
subject of enormous criticism in the press. Undoubtedly, the ominous
360. Id.
361. Fourth Amendment and the Internet: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Con-
stitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 160th Cong. 73-75
(April 6, 2000), available at LEXIS, Federal News Service, LEGIS; FEDNEW (prepared
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sounding name contributed to the negative publicity and Carnivore was
eventually renamed "DCS 1000,,.366
In a July 11, 2000 letter to Hon. Charles Canady and Hon. Melvin
Watt, members of the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on
the Constitution, the American Civil Liberties Union expressed con-
cern about the means of operation of Carnivore. Citing to the article in
the Wall Street Journal, the ACLU articulated its objections as follows:
[U]nlike the operation of a traditional pen register, trap and
trace device, or wiretap of a conventional phone line, Carnivore
gives the FBI access to all traffic over the ISP's network, not
just the communications to or from a particular target. Carni-
vore, which is capable of analyzing millions of messages per
second, purportedly retains only the messages of the specified
target, although this process takes place without scrutiny of ei-
ther the ISP or a court.
Carnivore permits access to the email of every customer of an
ISP and the email of every person who communicates with
them. Carnivore is roughly equivalent to a wiretap capable of
accessing the contents of the conversations of all of the phone
company's customers, with the "assurance" that the FBI will
record only conversations of the specified target. This "trust us,
we are the Government" approach is the antithesis of the pro-
cedures required under our the [sic] wiretapping laws. They
authorize limited electronic surveillance of the communica-
tions of specified persons, usually conducted by means of
specified communications devices. They place on the provider
of the communications medium the responsibility to separate
the communications of persons authorized to be intercepted
from other communications.
Currently, law enforcement is required to "minimize" its
interception of non-incriminating communications of a target of a
wiretap order. Carnivore is not a minimizing tool. Instead,
Carnivore maximizes law enforcement access to communications
of non-targets."'
366. Erich Luening, FBI takes the teeth out of Carnivore's name, CNET NEWS.COM,
February 9, 2001, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-252368.html (last visited November 23,
2003).
367. Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Director ACLU Washington National Office, et al.,
to Hon. Charles T. Canady and Hon. Melvin L. Watt, U.S. House of Representatives Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution (July 11, 2000), available at
http://archive.aclu.org/congress/071100a.html (last visited November 23, 2003).
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The ACLU position is unpersuasive in arguing that wiretapping law
requires the communications provider, rather than law enforcement
officials, to separate the communications of the subject of the investi-
gation from the communications of everyone else. To the contrary, the
Federal Wiretap Act at 18 U.S.C. § 2516(3)368 grants power to a judge
to authorize "the interception of electronic communications by an in-
vestigative or law enforcement officer." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) adds that
"an order authorizing the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic
communication under this chapter shall, upon request of the applicant,
direct that a provider of wire or electronic communication service...
shall furnish the applicant forthwith all ... technical assistance neces-
sary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively. 3 69 Thus, the statute
contemplates that interception will be accomplished by law enforce-
ment officers, but gives them the option to demand assistance from the
communication service provider.
As a practical matter, law enforcement officers may often rely on
the communication service provider to execute the search, but they are
not required to do so by statute. The safeguards of the Federal Wiretap
Act do not charge the communication service provider with the pri-
mary responsibility to intercept email as a means to prevent abuses by
law enforcement. And law enforcement officers who shift too much
responsibility to the communication provider may run afoul of the
Fourth Amendment, although case law to this effect has been overruled
by statute.37°
Moreover, the ACLU position fails to recognize the technological
differences between conventional wire telephones and electronic com-
munications over the Internet. Mr. Corn-Revere's statement to the
Subcommittee on the Constitution correctly explained that a telephone
call over a traditional circuit-switched telephone network creates a con-
368. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(3) (2000).
369. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (2000). However, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) authorizes the govern-
ment to require the provider of electronic communication service to disclose the contents of
wire or electronic communication held in electronic storage. Apparently, the statute envisions
the electronic communications service provider, rather than law enforcement officers, as hav-
ing primary responsibility for executing a search for stored communications.
370. See United States v. Bach, No. CRIM.01-221 PAM/ESS, 2001 WL 1690055
(D.Minn. Dec. 14, 2001), rev'd 310 E3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002) (Minnesota police officers faxed
a search warrant to Yahoo calling for certain email messages in a person's mailbox). The dis-
trict court decision is troubling because it would require police officers to travel cross-country
in order to execute a warrant even though they are not qualified to provide meaningful super-
vision to ISP employees. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g) has been amended to expressly state that the
presence of an officer is not necessary during service or execution of a search warrant seeking
disclosure of the contents of communications by a provider of electronic communications
service. Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11010, 116 Stat. 1758 at 1822 (2002).
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nection that is dedicated entirely to that conversation.37' But the Internet
is a packet-switched network that operates without a single, unbroken
connection between the sender and the receiver. Information sent over
the Internet is broken into many small packets that are reassembled in
the proper order when they are received at the destination.372
The differences in communications technology dictate that the FBI
use software known as a "packet sniffer" in order to establish a pen
register, trap and trace device, or wiretap involving communications
over the Internet. 373 The software searches for packets whose headers
contain the email address of the sender or receiver under investigation
and copies that information as called for in the pen register or trap and
trace order. The software is also capable of copying the entire contents
of the message as authorized in a wiretap order. Copied information is
stored on an Iomega Jazz drive. Every day or two, an FBI agent re-
374moves the Jazz cartridge and inserts a new one.
The ACLU's concern that the packet sniffer can read all of the
email on an ISP's network is unfounded. Although Carnivore reads the
headers of all messages passing through the ISP's network, the soft-
ware only recognizes those messages where the sender or receiver is
subject to investigation and copies the necessary information to disk.
All other messages traveling across the network are ignored. It is diffi-
cult to find an invasion of privacy when the packet sniffer harmlessly
reads the headers of email not subject to a surveillance order but re-
tains no information from that message and makes no record of the fact
that the message was ever sent.
While it is possible that FBI agents could program Carnivore to re-
cord all email on the ISP's network, it is unlikely that they could do so
without being discovered. According to the man who designed the soft-
ware, an attempt to record so much email would require the
cooperation of too many people, including employees of the ISP, to
maintain the secrecy of the effort.375
However, Mr. Corn-Revere's Congressional testimony pointed out
two significant concerns about the implementation of Carnivore. First,
a packet sniffer such as Carnivore has access to message routing in-
formation and actual content because both are contained in the packets.
So it is possible that Carnivore could be configured to reveal content
371. Corn-Revere testimony, supra note 361, at 73.
372. Id.
373. Ted Bridis & Neil King, Jr., Carnivore E-Mail Tool Won't Eat Up Privacy, Says
FBI, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2000 at A28; Jeff Tyson, How Carnivore Works, ABOUT.COM, at
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/carnivore.htm (last visited November 23, 2003).
374. Tyson, supra note 373.
375. Bridis & King, supra note 373.
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when a court has only authorized the FBI to obtain routing informa-
tion. Mr. Corn-Revere noted the potential for abuse when a pen register
can easily be modified to obtain message content beyond the scope of
judicial authorization.376
Second, at the time of Mr. Corn-Revere's testimony, the pen regis-
ter and trap and trace statute used language envisioning a physical
connection on a traditional telephone line rather than packet sniffing on
a computer network.3 7  Mr. Corn-Revere suggested that Congress
should consider updating the statute in light of new technologies."'
While much concern has been expressed about the technical capa-
bilities of Carnivore, less has been written about application of the
statutory limitations imposed upon it. This article has pointed out in
detail the restrictions imposed by the Federal Wiretap Act on law en-
forcement officers seeking to intercept email during the course of
transmission. In contrast, the Stored Communications Act imposes sub-
stantially lesser restrictions on law enforcement officers seeking access
to stored email that has already reached the recipient's mailbox.
Since Carnivore functions by intercepting email, law enforcement
officers who employ Carnivore to learn the contents of email are bound
by the rigorous safeguards of the Federal Wiretap Act. If law enforce-
ment officers employed software that copied incoming email after it
reached the recipient's mailbox and outgoing email while momentarily
queued up before being released for transmission to the recipient, the
lesser restrictions of the Stored Communications Act would govern. In
this light, the FBI should be commended by privacy advocates for us-
ing technology that subjects its agents to the rigorous standards of the
Federal Wiretap Act.
The obvious concern of privacy advocates is the potential for abuse
of software like Carnivore whereby law enforcement agents view the
contents of email beyond the scope of judicial authorization. Recogniz-
ing the extent of public concern about this issue, the Justice
Department commissioned an independent study of the capabilities of
376. Corn-Revere testimony, supra note 361, at 73.
377. Id. The statute was subsequently revised by sec. 216 of the USA PATRIOT Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 288-90 (2001).
378. Corn-Revere testimony, supra note 361, at 73.
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Carnivore.379 The Request for Proposals was released on August 24,
2000.380
The Request for Proposals quickly became controversial in its own
right. Some researchers questioned whether an independent analysis
could be conducted pursuant to the terms of the RFP. As a result, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, Purdue University, Dartmouth
College, the University of Michigan, and the Supercomputing Center at
the University of California at San Diego reportedly chose not to sub-
mit proposals.38" '
On September 6, 2000, the Department of Justice announced that it
had selected the Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute to
perform the technical review of Carnivore.382 IITRI issued a draft report
dated November 17, 2000383 and a final report dated December 8,
2000.3M
The final report concluded that:
Carnivore represents technology that protects privacy and en-
ables lawful surveillance better than alternatives such as
commercially available sniffer software. Carnivore restricts
collected information in a precise manner that cannot be dupli-
cated by other means. Although certain of Carnivore's
functions could be duplicated by commercial products, there is
no incentive to do so. The legitimate market for such a product
is limited to law enforcement-a market already served by
Carnivore. Moreover, publicly available products, such as
EtherPeek, ... are not capable of limiting collection as pre-
cisely as most court orders require, resulting in over-collection
379. See U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL REVIEW
OF THE CARNIVORE SYSTEM, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/RFP-execsumm.pdf (last
visited November 23, 2003); U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, SOLICITATION, OFFER, AND AWARD, at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/RFP.pdf (last visited November 23, 2003).
380. Cecily Barnes, DOJ Sets Rules for Carnivore Wiretap Investigation, CNET
NEWS.COM, August 24, 2000, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-244937.html (last visited No-
vember 23, 2003).
381. Cecily Barnes, DOJ Picks University to Study Carnivore, CNET NEWS.COM, Septem-
ber 26, 2000, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-246250.html (last visited November 23, 2003).
382. Id.
383. STEPHEN P. SMITH, ET AL., INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL REVIEW OF THE CARNIVORE
SYSTEM, DRAFT REPORT, at www.usdoj.gov/jmd/publications/carnivore draft 1 .pdf (November
17, 2000) (last visited November 23, 2003) (some material was redacted from the publicly avail-
able version. See http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/publications/carniventry.htm (last visited November
23, 2003)) [hereinafter DRAFT REPORT].
384. STEPHEN P. SMITH, ET AL., INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL REVIEW OF THE CARNIVORE
SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/camiv-final.pdf (December
8, 2000) (last visited November 23, 2003) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
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and greater reliance on human intervention to minimize the in-
formation collected. 9
The report recognized that Carnivore has the ability to over-collect
data beyond the scope of judicial authorization. The agent who sets up
Carnivore must select the proper filters to ensure that only the data
called for in the court order is recorded. Procedural safeguards mini-
mize the possibility of error because "multiple agents, FBI technical
advisers, and often ISP personnel must agree on the settings before
Carnivore is turned on. 386
The report also noted that when used as a pen register/trap and
trace device to record the sender and receiver of email, Carnivore
arguably collects more information than is authorized.3 87 Carnivore
properly captures the contents of the "TO" and "FROM" fields of an
email message. But it replaces characters in other fields with the letter
"X". Thus, agents can determine the length of a message, but not the
content. In this regard, Carnivore may be out of compliance with 18
U.S.C. § 3121(c), which requires a government agency to use
reasonably available technology so as to prevent a pen register/trap and
trace device from recording anything other than dialing or addressing
information.389
The report downplays the possibility that Carnivore can spy on all
email users across the ISP's network because the volume of data would
quickly fill up the storage media on the computer running the soft-390
ware. More seriously, the report points out that the Carnivore
software does not require each agent to log in with a unique ID in order
385. Id. 4.2.1, at 4-2.
386. Id. 1 4.2.3, at 4-3.
387. Id. 1 4.3.1, at 4-9.
388. Id. The ability to measure the length of a message goes beyond the scope of a tradi-
tional telephone pen register/trap and trace device. This feature constitutes a further invasion
of privacy because it goes to the content of the message in question. For example, it has been
pointed out that:
This data may seem insignificant, but consider the following hypothetical: A judge
authorizes FBI agents to use Carnivore to capture e-mail addresses sent to and from
a person suspected of violating child pornography laws. While the agents are view-
ing this information, they notice most messages are small but some are
extraordinarily large, perhaps indicating that illegal pictures are being transmitted.
Therefore, in some cases the FBI has the ability to ascertain, or at least accurately
guess, the nature of an e-mail without first obtaining Title III authorization.
Manton M. Grier, Jr., Comment, The Software Formerly Known as "Carnivore": When does
E-Mail Surveillance Encroach Upon a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?, 52 S.C. L. REV.
875, 886-87 (2001).
389. 18 U.S.C. §3121(c) (2000); see Rosow, supra note 102, at 1062.
390. FINAL REPORT, supra note 384, 4.2.3, at 4-4.
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to change any of the filter settings. So it is not possible to ensure indi-
vidual accountability for such changes."' The report is quite extensive
and contains much more information than will be summarized here.
In actual use, it was widely reported that Carnivore overcollected
information on at least one occasion involving a terrorism investigation
conducted by the unit within the FBI that investigates activities of al
Qaeda. The reports originated from the Electronic Privacy Information
392Center, which obtained an internal FBI memo pursuant to a Freedom
of Information Act request. According to an EPIC press release,393 the
memo reveals that Carnivore not only captured the email of the target
of the investigation, but also included email of other people beyond the
scope of judicial authorization. The memo also reveals that the agent
conducting the surveillance was so upset that he destroyed all of the
captured email, including the messages whose interception was judi-
cially authorized.394
This episode serves as a reminder that technology will occasionally
malfunction. Moreover, it is unlikely that technology can entirely
prevent human error or intentional misconduct on the part of the police.
In the final analysis, society must place a certain amount of trust in the
competence and integrity of law enforcement officials. If that trust is
violated, they must be held accountable. But outright rejection of
Carnivore and the underlying packet sniffing technology for fear of
potential abuse would unduly limit necessary law enforcement
operations. However, as is true of all software, Carnivore is subject to
modification and new versions may be created by the FBI. It would be
prudent to provide for a periodic independent review of the software to
ensure that appropriate operational safeguards are not lost in the
395
upgrade process.
391. Id. 4.2.4, at 4-5.
392. Memorandum from unknown person, to Spike Bowman at the FBI (April 5, 2000),
available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore/fisa.html (last visited November 23, 2003).
393. Press Release, Electronic Privacy Information Center, FBI's Carnivore System
Disrupted Anti-Terror Investigation (May 28, 2002), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/
carnivore/5_02_release.html (last visited November 23, 2003).
394. An FBI spokesman said that the memo is incorrect. The emails were retained and
remain under seal. Dan Eggen, "Carnivore" Glitches Blamed for FBI Woes; Problems with e-
Mail Surveillance Program Led to Mishandling of al Qaeda Probe in 2000 Memo Says,
WASH. POST, May 29, 2002, at A7.
395. FINAL REPORT, supra note 384, 1 5.9, at 5-4.
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VII. ENCRYPTED EMAIL AND KEYSTROKE LOGGERS
Carnivore enables law enforcement officers to intercept email and
read its contents. However, email that has been encrypted poses addi-
tional difficulties. Although Carnivore can intercept encrypted email,
the contents cannot be read without the proper "key." In order to read
encrypted email, law enforcement officers must employ additional
technologies to surreptitiously obtain the key.
Cryptography software garbles a message through a mathematical
formula known as an encryption algorithm so that only the sender and
the receiver, who are in possession of the key, can read it. The key can
be a number, a word, or a phrase. The key operates as a password.
When the receiver enters the proper key, the encryption algorithm de-
396
crypts the message.
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is a popular and effective encryption
program based on a type of encryption known as public key cryptogra-
phy. The software generates a public key and a private key for an
individual. This person would make his public key generally available
to the world, but would maintain the secrecy of his private key.
By way of example, suppose Sender wants to send a secure email
message to Receiver. Sender uses the software and Receiver's public
key to encrypt the message before emailing it to Receiver. When the
message arrives, Receiver then uses the software and his private key to
decrypt the message.397
The first known judicial decision addressing FBI efforts to covertly
obtain and decrypt encrypted files is United States v. Scafo.3 98 Scarfo
was suspected of following in his father's footsteps as an organized
crime figure. 399 As part of an investigation into illegal gambling and
loan-sharking, the FBI obtained a warrant to surreptitiously search
Scarfo's office for evidence. During the search, FBI agents copied files
396. See SIMSON GARFINKEL, PGP: PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY 34-39 (1995). It is possible,
but very difficult, to decrypt an encrypted message without the key. To prove a point, the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation conducted an experiment involving a well-known encryption
algorithm called "DES." As of 1995, it was believed that a computer capable of decrypting a
DES-encrypted message within a few hours could be built for approximately $1 million. But
no government or corporation would admit to owning such a computer. In 1998, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation built a computer that could decrypt a DES-encrypted message in 3 days at
a cost of $220,000. Having completed the basic research, the Electronic Frontier Foundation
could build another computer for $50,000. Id. at 43; See Randy Weston, Group Cracks Crypto
Standard, CNET NEWS.COM, July 17, 1998 at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-213461.html?
legacy=cnet&tag=st.cn. I fd2 (last visited November 23, 2002).
397. GARFINKEL, supra note 396, at 47-50.
398. 180 F Supp. 2d. 572 (D.N.J. 2001).
399. Jonathan Krim, High-Tech FBI Tactics Raise Privacy Questions, WASH. POST, Au-
gust 14, 2001, atAl.
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found on Scarfo's computer, but discovered that a file named "Factors"
was encrypted through Pretty Good Privacy software and could not be
read.4°°
The agents subsequently returned to the office pursuant to another
warrant authorizing them to place a keystroke logger on Scarfo's com-
puter. The keystroke logger records the keystrokes entered on the
computer's keyboard. The FBI eventually obtained the password and
retrieved incriminating evidence from the file.'
The Government has revealed few details about the manner in
which the keystroke logger operates. It is not even known whether the
logger is a software program or a hardware device. At trial, Scarfo
sought discovery and moved to suppress the evidence obtained from
his computer. The court was particularly troubled by the possibility that
use of the keystroke logger by the FBI violated the Federal Wiretap
Act. The court explained:
In an August 7, 2001, Letter Opinion and Order, this court ex-
pressed serious concerns over whether the government violated
the wiretap statute in utilizing the [keystroke logger] on
Scarfo's computer. Specifically, the Court expressed concern
over whether the [keystroke logger] may have operated during
periods when Scarfo (or any other user of his personal com-
puter) was communicating via modem over telephone lines,
thereby unlawfully intercepting wire communications without
having applied for a wiretap pursuant to Title III, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510."°2
The court ordered the government to file a report explaining the
technology behind the keystroke logger and addressing its ability to
operate while the modem was in use. But the government argued that
disclosure of the information would jeopardize national security inter-
ests and requested an in camera, ex parte hearing pursuant to the
Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980.403 After conducting the
hearing, the court permitted the government to merely provide Scarfo
with an unclassified summary of the information related to the key-
stroke logger. The court believed that the summary was sufficient to
400. Scarfo, 180 F Supp. 2d at 574.
401. Id. The password turned out to be the prison identification number of Scarfo's fa-
ther. Krim, supra note 399.
402. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 575.
403. 18 U.S.C. Appendix IIl, §§ 1-16 (2000). However, keystroke loggers are available
commercially. Karen J. Barman, Watching You, Watching Me, PC MAGAZINE, July 2002, at 99.
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allow Scarfo to challenge the admissibility of the evidence taken from
his computer."
The court ultimately held that the FBI did not intercept a commu-
nication in the course of transmission over the telephone lines.4 °5
Therefore, the warrant obtained by the FBI was sufficient to authorize
use of the keystroke logger. The FBI was not required to obtain au-
thorization under the Federal Wiretap Act.4°6
The court reached this conclusion based on the affidavit of an FBI
official, who explained that the FBI "did not install and operate any
component which would search for and record data entering or exiting
the computer from the transmission pathway through the modem at-
tached to the computer.' 4°7 In other words, the FBI configured the
keystroke logger "to avoid intercepting electronic communications
typed on the keyboard and simultaneously transmitted in real time via
the communications ports. 4 8
However, it has been pointed out that "even if the key logger didn't
intercept communication after it was sent by the computer's modem, it
effectively does the same thing by capturing what is typed on an e-mail
or instant message form just before the user hits the send button.''4" 9
This issue highlights a fundamental flaw underlying the rationale of the
wiretapping statutes. If the FBI agents had intercepted Scarfo's
communications during transmission, they would have been bound by
the detailed safeguards of the Federal Wiretap Act. But where the FBI
surreptitiously obtained the same material directly from Scarfo's
computer, they were merely bound by the less rigorous safeguards
against surreptitious searches generally as per Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41, which did not expressly address sneak and peak searches
at that time."'
Yet it can be persuasively argued that a person's privacy interest in
a file on his computer (or a paper document in his desk) behind locked
office doors is equivalent to the privacy interest in a telephone call or
an email message. If so, that electronic file or paper document locked
up in a closed office should be afforded the same protection from sur-
reptitious searches by law enforcement officers.
404. Scarfo, 180 F Supp. 2d at 575-76.
405. Id. at 581.
406. Id. at 581-82.
407. Id. at 581.
408. Id. at 581-82.
409. Krim, supra note 399.
410. Subsequently, the USA PATRIOT Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 3103a to provide some
additional guidance as to the procedures regulating sneak and peak searches. See supra note
60 and Part V.C.
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Moreover, the "Factors" file on Scarfo's computer that was ob-
tained covertly by law enforcement officers was not said to have ever
been communicated to anyone by Scarfo. The privacy interest in mate-
rial locked in a person's home or office where the owner sought to
maintain total secrecy is arguably greater than the privacy interest in a
phone call, where a party to a telephone conversation is revealing in-
formation to at least one other person.
But the similarity between privacy interests is often neglected be-
cause telephone wiretaps must always be conducted covertly, while
searches of files in a desk or on a computer are most often conducted
with contemporaneous notice to the owner. It is reasonable to set lower
safeguards governing search and seizure with contemporaneous notice
because a lesser invasion of privacy arguably occurs when the execu-
tion of the search is not hidden from the property owner. But this
article asserts that the invasion of privacy taking place when the police
covertly break into a home or office to conduct a search is equivalent to
the invasion of privacy taking place when the police covertly conduct a
wiretap so the procedural safeguards should be the same.
Nevertheless, the statutes provide the greatest level of protection to
a telephone call. This discrepancy in the level of protection from sur-
reptitious searches illustrates the shortcoming of a technology-based
analysis. Rather than looking to the technology to determine the level
of protection from covert searches by law enforcement officers, Con-
gress should focus on the underlying privacy interest that exists
regardless of technology and medium of communication. The underly-
ing privacy interest at issue when the police employ a low-technology
covert entry into a house to search for paper documents is the same as
the privacy interest at issue when the police conduct a high-technology
wiretap of a person's telephone.
Once again, it is interesting to look back at how this area of law
has evolved since Olmstead"' was decided in 1928. Back then, the
Supreme Court was willing to provide safeguards against an intrusion
into a person's home or office, but was not willing to recognize a
privacy interest in a telephone call traveling over the telephone lines.
Today, the statutes create stringent safeguards to protect telephone calls
and email messages traveling over the telephone lines or the Internet,
but afford significantly lesser protections against the FBI secretly
entering a locked home or office to search for communications and
other documents stored on a computer.
411. 277 U.S. 465 (1928).
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VIII. TOWARD A UNIFORM PROCEDURE GOVERNING
SURREPTITIOUS SEARCH AND SEIZURE
This article has discussed the stringent procedural requirements
that must be satisfied before law enforcement officials can lawfully
conduct a telephone wiretap. These requirements originated in Berger
v. New York412 and were codified along with additional safeguards in the
Federal Wiretap Act.4 3 But the courts have never adequately explained
why such rigorous standards apply uniquely to telephone wiretaps 4
In 1928, Justice Brandeis asserted that a telephone wiretap consti-
tutes a greater invasion of privacy than interception of a letter in the
mail because a wiretap invades the privacy of both parties to the con-
versation, and potentially intrudes upon discussion that is unrelated to
criminal activity.415 Wiretapping of a person's telephone also eaves-
drops on conversations with everyone he calls and everyone who calls
him 4 6
But the same is true for the covert search of an ongoing exchange
of postal mail or email between the person under surveillance and the
people he communicates with. So Justice Brandeis' observation does
not account for the distinctions that developed in the law governing
covert searches of postal mail or email.
The unstated assumption of Berger seems to be that the real-time,
covert interception of a telephone conversation by law enforcement
officials somehow constitutes a greater invasion of privacy than a
covert search of other media of private communications and so should
be subject to greater safeguards. Such an assumption is consistent with
enactment of the Federal Wiretap Act in 1968, where Congress did not
broadly draft the statute to provide the same protection against covert
interception of letters in the mail. And the assumption was implicit in
the 1986 Federal Wiretap Act amendments applicable to the
interception of electronic communication (which afforded less
protection than was afforded to wire communication) as well as the
Stored Communications Act governing stored wire and electronic
communications (which were afforded even less protection).
This article questions that assumption. This article argues that pre-
cisely the same privacy interest is implicated regardless of whether the
surreptitious search of a communication takes place in real-time and
regardless of the medium of communication so long as the communica-
412. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
413. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
414. See supra Part V.A.
415. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475-76 (1928).
416. Id.
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tions technology is reasonably designed to avoid unintentional inter-
ception by third parties.
In other words, the Fourth Amendment and the applicable statutes
should provide the same level of protection from covert searches to any
medium of communication that is deemed worthy of protection at all
and the same procedural safeguards should govern. Thus, Berger would
be better interpreted as focusing on the surreptitious nature of the inva-
sion of privacy rather than on the real-time nature of the medium of
communication. But Berger has not been so construed, and the statu-
tory codification of Berger has not been so far-reaching.
By way of comparison, the courts have long held that search and
seizure of a letter in the mail must be based on a judicially issued
search warrant supported by probable cause. As early as 1877, the Su-
preme Court recognized that Fourth Amendment protections apply to
letters in the mail just as they apply to papers retained in the sender's
home.1 7
However, the situation becomes more complicated where law en-
forcement officials secretly intercept an ongoing stream of mail
without contemporaneous notice to the subject of the investigation. The
stringent Berger standards have never been applied where the medium
of communication is conventional postal mail. Rather, the lesser pro-
tections of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3103a govern. This article asserts that the privacy interest in postal
mail is equivalent to the privacy interest in telephone conversations and
both are deserving of the same protection against covert searches de-
spite the real-time nature of the telephone.
It would not be unreasonable to expand the Berger standards and
the statutory protections for wire communications to govern all covert
searches for private communications or personal documents. The Ninth
Circuit's decision in Freitas I analogized the sneak and peak search to
a telephone wiretap .4 " The court asserted that a showing of necessity in
the application for a sneak and peak warrant would strengthen the
government's argument that the covert search was conducted in
compliance with the Fourth Amendment.4 ' 9 Even though the Ninth
Circuit was willing to draw the analogy, the court was unwilling to go
so far as to require a showing of necessity in order to obtain a sneak
and peak warrant. In contrast, the Second Circuit's decision in United
States v. Villegas imposed a standard of reasonable necessity to justify
417. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
418. 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The surreptitious character of the search and
seizure in this case calls to mind wiretapping....
419. Id.
88 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
a covert entry search.40 A similar, but apparently less rigorous standard
was recently codified by the USA PATRIOT Act.42'
As new types of communications devices proliferate and gain in
popularity, Congress continues to afford the greatest safeguards against
covert surveillance to telephone conversations. Nevertheless, the his-
tory of the Federal Wiretap Act shows a continual struggle to apply the
statute to emerging telephone technologies, often with unsound results.
For example, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a conversation tak-
ing place over two mobile phones was not necessarily protected by the
Federal Wiretap Act as it existed at the time, while a conversation tak-
ing place between a conventional, wire telephone and a mobile phone
would be protected. Other courts held that the wire portion of a port-
able telephone conversation was protected by the early language of the
statute, but the broadcast portion of the conversation was not pro-
tected.422
In 1986, the Federal Wiretap Act was amended to protect cellular
telephone conversations, but the statute expressly excluded the broad-
cast portion of portable telephone conversations. 2 It was not until
1994 that the exclusion of the broadcast portion of portable telephone
424conversations was deleted from the statute.
Similarly, the Federal Wiretap Act amendments (and the Stored
Communications Act as well) pertaining to electronic communications
continue to unduly focus on technology rather than the underlying pri-
vacy interest. This undue emphasis on the medium of communication
likewise leads to unsound results when applying the statute to emerg-
ing Internet technologies. The problem derives in part from the
underlying difficulty of classifying Internet technologies as real-time
communications (which are arbitrarily afforded greater protections un-
der the Federal Wiretap Act) or stored communications (which are
arbitrarily afforded lesser protections under the Stored Communica-
tions Act). The issue is illustrated by the manner in which the two
statutes treat email. It follows from Steve Jackson Games425 that law
enforcement officers who want to intercept email in real time during
transmission must comply with the rigorous safeguards of the Federal
Wiretap Act. Yet if they access that same message in electronic storage
420. 899 F.2d 1324, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990). In establishing a standard of reasonable neces-
sity, Villegas expressly stated that the standard is not as rigorous as the requirement of the
Federal Wiretap Act. See supra Part lI.B.
421. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3103a (2003). See supra Part ll.B.
422. United States v. Hall, 488 E2d 193, 198 (9th Cir. 1973); see supra Part V.B.2.
423. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (Supp. IV 1986); see supra Part V.B.3.a.
424. See supra Part V.B.4.
425. 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
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after it reaches the recipient's mailbox, they need only comply with the
lesser protections of the Stored Communications Act.426
It would be hard to characterize the underlying privacy interest in
an email message as greater during the course of transmission than af-
ter it reaches the recipient's mailbox. Yet the statutes afford rigorous
safeguards against the interception of email during transmission by law
enforcement officers, while affording lesser protections against law
enforcement access to email held in electronic storage in the recipient's
mailbox at his Internet Service Provider.
In this regard, the drafters of the statutes did not anticipate a fun-
damental distinction between a telephone conversation and an email
message. A telephone conversation can only be monitored while it is
taking place, thereby giving rise to the real-time aspect of the wiretap.
But email is not quite as ephemeral as a telephone conversation. Email
can be intercepted while in transmission or accessed after it has actu-
ally reached the recipient's mailbox. Of course, the recipient can only
read it after it has been stored in his mailbox, so in that sense it is mis-
leading to talk about a real-time transmission of email because there is
inevitably some delay before even the intended recipient can read it.
This is the reason why the influential decision in Steve Jackson Games
struggled with the question of whether email could be intercepted
while in electronic storage. Actually, this question becomes moot if one
accepts the argument that the privacy interest remains the same regard-
less of whether the email is intercepted during transmission or accessed
from storage in the recipient's mailbox.
Poor statutory drafting has led to even greater difficulty in deter-
mining whether voicemail is capable of real-time interception. Until
amended by the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001, the Federal Wiretap Act
implied that voicemail can be intercepted for purposes of the statute.
However, the Stored Communications Act implied that voicemail is
merely accessed from storage, thereby losing the real-time immediacy
of a telephone call and the rigorous statutory protections that are af-
forded to it. The Ninth Circuit was directly confronted with this
discrepancy in United States v. Smith.427 The court resolved the issue
through a convoluted analysis leading to the conclusion that the Fed-
eral Wiretap Act governs the interception of voicemail.
Although the Ninth Circuit reached a desirable result in affording
the Federal Wiretap Act's greater protection to voicemail, it strained
too far in trying to reconcile the clearly inconsistent language between
426. See supra Part V.C. 1.
427. 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998).
428. Id. at 1058; see supra Part V.C.2.
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the two statutes. Alternatively, the court should have simply acknowl-
edged that the conflicting statutory provisions could not be reconciled
and so the court applied the greater protection of the Federal Wiretap
Act to voicemail.429
The reasoning of Smith was carried over into Konop v. Hawaiian
Airlines,430 which addressed the issue of whether a web page stored on
a web server could be intercepted for purposes of the Federal Wiretap
Act. If so, then the greater protections of the Federal Wiretap Act
would come into play.
In the context of a civil lawsuit, Konop I held that an electronic
communication could be intercepted even though it was already held in
electronic storage. Konop I had serious implications for law enforce-
ment because it leads to the conclusion that law enforcement officers
must always comply with the strict procedural requirements of the
Federal Wiretap Act in order to conduct a search for stored electronic
communications. Accordingly, the more relaxed warrant provisions of
the Stored Communications Act would be rendered irrelevant.43 '
Konop I was a logical extension of Smith, but the Ninth Circuit rec-
ognized its far reaching implications. Konop I was withdrawn. Konop
H held that access to a stored electronic communication such as a web
page is governed exclusively by the Stored Communications Act.
Konop H brought the Ninth Circuit in line with the Fifth Circuit, which
expressed the same view in Steve Jackson Games.
Konop I correctly stated that "an electronic communication in stor-
age is no more or less private than an electronic communication in
transmission., 432 It was also correct in asserting that "distinguishing
between the two for purposes of protection from interception is 'irra-
tional' . Nevertheless, the statutes call for significant distinctions
between them.
The arbitrary nature of the statutory distinctions will be magnified
when applying the statutes to Internet telephony, where a personal
computer can be used to talk to someone using another personal
computer or a conventional telephone. Likewise, they will be
exacerbated where the statutes determine the protections afforded to
429. USA PATRIOT Act amendments to the statutes provide that voicemail receives the
lesser protections of the Stored Communications Act, but the statutory amendments are sched-
uled to sunset on December 31, 2005. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 209, 115 Stat. 272, 283 (2001).
430. 236 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) [Konop I], opinion withdrawn by 262 F3d 972
(2001), superseded by 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002) [Konop 11], cert. denied 537 U.S. 1193
(2003).
431. See supra Part V.C.3.
432. Konop 1, 236 F.3d at 1044-46.
433. Id.
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communications via Personal Digital Assistants incorporating cell
phone technology, and to cell phones featuring Internet access.434 As
society grows to view telephone and Internet technologies as
essentially one and the same, any distinctions will become increasingly
out of touch with the privacy expectations of the American public.
Further statutory deficiencies will come to light as law enforce-
ment officials employ new surveillance technologies. Scarfo4 5 provides
yet another example of arbitrary results that follow from the current
statutory scheme. There, the FBI did not intercept Scarfo's email.
Rather, FBI agents covertly entered Scarfo's office and copied files
directly from Scarfo's computer. When they saw that a file was en-
crypted, they surreptitiously returned and secretly installed a keystroke
logger while no one was in the office. Subsequently, they returned
again and, using data collected by the keystroke logger, discovered the
encryption password needed to decrypt the file. These activities were
all judicially approved by search warrants authorizing sneak and peak
searches, but the FBI agents were not required to comply with the de-
tailed safeguards of the Federal Wiretap Act. 36
Once again, the statutory scheme yields a poor result by wrongly
focusing on the issue of whether the FBI conducted a real-time inter-
ception of communications during transmission. The investigators were
careful to avoid any such interception by configuring the keystroke
logger to not record keystrokes while the modem was transmitting. In-
stead, the keystroke logger could record keystrokes moments before
transmission and effectively make available the same information.
Since the keystroke logger did not provide the FBI with real-time in-
formation intercepted during transmission, the Federal Wiretap Act did
not govern the search. And since the FBI accessed a document stored
on a personal computer in a person's office rather than a document
stored at an electronic communication service, the Stored Communica-
tions Act was likewise inapplicable. Rather, the only safeguards were
the standards governing sneak and peak searches in general.
However, this article asserts that the privacy interest in an elec-
tronic document stored on a personal computer or a paper document
434. Under the current statutory scheme, the courts will need to determine whether those
conversations amount to wire communications or electronic communications. In either case,
the Federal Wiretap Act governs interception by law enforcement officers during transmission.
Of course, this article has repeatedly asserted that the statute provides greater protections
while communications are in transmission than when they are in storage, but the inquiry does
not end there. The Federal Wiretap Act also provides greater protection for wire communica-
tion during transmission than for electronic communication during transmission.
435. 180 F Supp. 2d. 572 (D.N.J. 2001).
436. Id. at 574, 581.
437. Id. at 581-82.
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stored in a file cabinet locked in a person's office is deserving of at
least as much protection from covert searches by law enforcement offi-
cials as is afforded to a telephone call. The privacy interest that is
compromised when the police conduct a covert search remains the
same regardless of whether the material seized exists in wire, elec-
tronic or paper format and regardless of whether the material is
intercepted during transmission or accessed from storage. Therefore,
the Berger standards should govern the decision whether to grant judi-
cial authorization for the covert search. To the extent that the statutes
expand upon the Berger safeguards to determine whether the courts
will permit the police to implement a telephone wiretap, the statutes
should likewise expand the safeguards in these other contexts as well.
Scarfo demonstrates the appropriateness of the Freitas I analogy
between sneak and peak searches and telephone wiretaps. Scarfo
clearly had a significant privacy interest in an encrypted document
stored on a computer locked in his office and not knowingly revealed
to anyone. Scarfo's expectation that the police will not covertly enter
his office to learn the contents of the document is at least as great as his
expectation that the same document, when attached to an email mes-
sage, will not be covertly intercepted by the police during transmission
to another person. Yet under the current statutory scheme, greater pro-
tection against a covert police search is afforded to a communication
during transmission than is afforded to a document that remains locked
in an office and is never communicated to anyone at all.
A better statutory scheme would provide uniform regulation of all
covert police searches of documents and communications regardless of
whether they exist on paper, in wire format, or in electronic format.
Such regulation should be codified in a single chapter of the U.S.
Code. There is no justification for giving a telephone call more protec-
tion than an email message. Likewise, there is no justification for
giving an email message in the course of transmission more protection
than a message stored in a mailbox at an Internet Service Provider or in
a personal computer locked in a person's home.
This proposed statutory revision would focus on the invasion of
privacy that takes place during the execution of a covert search, which
is more significant than the current focus on the real-time nature of the
search. Of course, it is not possible to objectively quantify a person's
privacy interest in his personal computer or file cabinet as compared to
his privacy interest in the telephone lines or his electronic mailbox.
Nevertheless, the same privacy interest is compromised regardless of
whether the communication is covertly intercepted in real time (as in
the case of a telephone call) or whether covert access to the communi-
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cation is delayed (as in the case of a letter in the postal mail or an
email in electronic storage).438
The arbitrary distinctions that began with Berger and were subse-
quently expanded by statute are overdue for revision. A new scheme
focusing on the underlying privacy interest should be implemented.
The current scheme, with its focus on the medium of communication,
will not yield good results because the legislative process cannot keep
up with the pace of innovation in communications technology.
Justice Brandeis was correct in 1928 when he anticipated that tech-
nological advancement will enable the Government to employ tools of
surveillance extending beyond wiretapping. He asserted that Fourth
Amendment protections must be interpreted broadly so as to safeguard
against new abuses that were not previously envisioned. Thus, Brandeis
sought to protect the individual's "right to be let alone" without regard
to the different technologies that might be employed by the Govern-
ment to compromise that right.439 His focus on the underlying privacy
interest would be more workable than the statutes currently in force.
438. The proposed statutory revisions could be drafted to apply exclusively to covert
searches for documents and communications, or could apply more broadly to all covert
searches because the intrusion into privacy interests is so similar.
439. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-74, 478 (1928); see supra Part IV.A.
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